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The Internet is widely believed to be promoting world democracy, the 
overthrow of authoritarian regimes as well as the end of nationalism and 
national identity. This notion that the Internet has the potential to 
revolutionise social structures, especially with regards to nations is based 
upon the widely accepted role of print media in the creation of nations in 
post-renaissance Europe. While theorists from diverse disciplines and 
ideological persuasions have predicted the end of the nation as the mode of 
social solidarity par excellence, believing that the freedom of the Internet 
will strengthen civic values and weaken the state's ideological hegemony, 
empirical studies have found that nationalist sentiment is not only 
unchecked but is typical of political debate on the Internet, and these 
findings have been interpreted as an indicator of the state's success at 
extending its hegemony into cyberspace. However, these theoretical 
predictions and interpretations rely on the problematic assumptions that 
nations and national identities are necessarily constructed by 
state-institutions and that nationalist discourse threatens or is threatened by 
the development of civic and capitalist values. Such assumptions about 
nations and national identity are especially prevalent in media and scholarly 
commentary on Chinese national identity and this study seeks to 
re-examine the nature of Chinese nationalist discourses on the Internet. A 
comparison of national discourses online and in the print media in 
Mainland China, Hong Kong and the Chinese Diaspora is conducted by 
examining the national discursive frames used to interpret the September 
11th attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. While the result of this 
study confirms previous work that suggests that mass media discourses of 
the Chinese nation remain firmly under the yoke of powerful nation-state 
institutions, online discourses of Chinese identity are found to be different 
from the discourses of Chinese nation found in the mass media. Contrary to 
the prevailing view, evidence is found to suggest that unlike the mass media, 
the discourse of Chinese nation dominant in online political forums is a 
populist transnational imagination rather than a state-instigated ideology. 
Moreover, rather than provide ideological support for the Chinese state, this 
online nationalism has an ambivalent relationship with the Chinese 
party-state and also advocates the civic values of economic and political 
freedom by indigenising and hybridizing these values with traditional 
Chinese discourses. These results suggest that the prevalence of online 
nationalism is weak evidence for the extension of state hegemony into 
cyberspace and also demands a reappraisal be made of liberal-pluralist 
assumptions about the relationship between the Internet, civil society and 
nationalism. Instead, rather than view the Internet as a boon for civil 
society and a force against nations and national identity, the Internet should 
be seen as a site where global citizens may freely associate for 
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The Nation Lives On 
The globalisation of communication has being seen as heralding fundamental changes 
to human society. As the Gutenberg revolution was thought to have made the nation 
possible by creating a polity based upon a national media system (Anderson, 1983; 
Carey, 1998), the emergence of a globalised media system, epitomised by the Internet, 
is widely thought to herald the decline of nations as a centre of power and the end of the 
nation as the canonical scheme of global political organisation. 
The liberal-pluralist scholar argues that while that mass media has been a major 
centralising force, concentrating the right to speak into the hands of a powerful few, the 
Internet, with a decentralised network structure and its global reach, is beginning to 
penetrate nations with uncontrollable transnational networks of communication which 
further promotes existing transnational flows of trade and people. In this view, such 
transnational networks of trade, people and data work to dilute the state's ability to 
narrate (or ignore) global events, which weakens its ability define a national identity. 
Hence, as the Internet brings about Shapiro's (1999) Control Revolution, undermining 
existing hierarchical social structures and chains of command, the state's ability to 
define the national culture and identity is undermined and we would be thrust into 
Francis Fukuyama's (1992) free and democratic End of History. 
However, while liberal scholars and politicians predicted that the popularisation of the 
Internet would lead to a postmodern global culture where the spectre of national 
identity and other hegemonies would have no foothold, leading in the short term, to the 
overthrow of authoritarian states such as China (Drake et al，2000) and in the long term, 
to cultural hybridity and flexi-identities, numerous empirical studies of Internet 
2 
discourse have found that that online political debate lives up to neither modernist 
hopes for a virtual public sphere nor postmodern dreams of a playful Cultural 
Supermarket (Mathews, 2000). 
Rather, despite the globalization of travel, trade, telecommunications, and civic values, 
"old fashioned" ethnic solidarities are anything but dead and imaginations of ancient 
national traditions and territorial homelands continue to be potent shapers of human 
activity (Scheff, 1994; Smith, 1990). This activity extends itself into the online world 
and studies of the online political discourse of Chinese netizens have contributed to a 
reappraisal of the Internet's emancipating potential. For example, studies of Usenet 
discourse based upon Habermas' theory of communicative rationality noted that online 
texts are neither rational nor free from divisions of ethnicity, race or class (Fung and 
Kedl, 2001; Kuan, 2001) and Qiu (2000) finds that online political discourse in China 
tended to be overwhelmingly nationalist, characterising perhaps the bulk of its online 
political discourse. Such findings are supported by a number of other studies that show 
netizens' subjectivities remain split along ethnic or nationalist divisions (e.g. Ma and 
Yuen, 2002; Mills, 2002; Poblocki, 2001; Sundaram, 2000; and Zhang, 2003). 
Such findings have been interpreted as evidence that states, particularly authoritarian 
ones, are successfully meeting the challenge of the Internet and extending their 
hegemony into cyberspace. However, studies that interpret findings of online 
nationalism as the extension of state media hegemony have merely assumed that online 
nationalism is state-instigated and are unable to account for the fact that online 
nationalism is often critical of and in turn suppressed by the state. These studies are 
also unable to explain why nationalist discourse is found outside of the control of 
authoritarian states and are contributed to by an increasingly wide demographic - for 
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example, many ethnic-Chinese forums in the West also have nationalist leanings. 
Moreover, by demonising Chinese nationalism as a form of false consciousness, in 
which Chinese are misled by their government and waiting to be awakened by Western 
liberators, such studies play into Orientalist notions of an oppressed Chinese people 
waiting to be saved by the West. 
This "liberal-pluralist" interpretation of the relationship between the Internet and 
nationalism make the assumption that national identity is an instrument of the state - i.e. 
an ideology invented by government elites for the purposes of Machiavellian control. 
There is little or no consideration that such nationalisms may be popular movements 
and it is assumed that as the state's control of communication erodes further, nationalist 
discourses such as those found in Chinese online political forums will eventually fade 
away. Such views also assume that as nationalism represents the notion of community 
or gemeinschaft and is used to consolidate the power of the state, it is antithetical to 
civil society and civil society's associated values of freedom and democracy and free 
market capitalism. However, as Ernest Gellner (in Hall, 1995) and others argue, 
nationalism and civic values have historically been mutually supporting and even in 
contemporary society it is often the case that modem nationalisms, including for 
example, American national identity, base their pride in precisely the values of freedom 
and democracy or capitalist economic power. 
However, an alternative view, which Unger (1996:ix) terms 'postmodern', rejects the 
liberal-pluralist view as a simplistic structuralist propaganda model in which 
nationalism, particularly Chinese nationalism, is seen as state-supporting propaganda 
disseminated by an all-powerful mass media. Instead, such a 'postmodern' (or perhaps 
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better described as 'culturalist') view argues that nationalism is contested, hybrid and 
polysemic. 
To say that nationalism is contested means that multiple parties with vested-interests 
fight to define the national discourse. Moreover, these interested parties comprise not 
only of competing factions of state elites but also of intellectuals, religious leaders, 
business people and members of other civil society organisations who do not have 
formal political power. Hence, in this view, nationalism can just as easily be a populist 
movement used to delegitimise the state as it can be a state-instigated project used to 
support itself. 
To conceptualise nationalism as hybrid and polysemic refers to the fact that a certain set 
of nationalist symbols and practices may hold different meanings to different groups 
and that such symbols and practices can be subverted, adapted and combined with other 
symbols and practices or beliefs in order to support or challenge the legitimacy of 
competing factions. Hence, rather than see certain ideas such as nationalism and civic 
values as fundamentally oppositional, the same set of nationalist symbols used by state 
elites to justify its authoritarian rule may in the hands of other parties be used to support 
capitalist and civic values. 
In summary, this alternative view, which I refer to in this study as 'the culturalist view '， 
sees national identity as made up of a set of symbols and practices interpreted and 
manipulated and by a number of interested factions rather than a universally-shared set 
of symbols and practices with uniform meanings determined solely by state elites. 
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This study questions the liberal-pluralist view of online Chinese nationalism as a 
reflection of state instrumentalism and through closely studying this discourse, seeks a 
reappraisal of its fundamental nature and asks whether the culturalist view may serve to 
be a more adequate theory of the relationship between the Internet, civil society and 
nationalism than does the prevailing, liberal-pluralist paradigm. By conducting a 
comparative study of the national discursive frames used in online and mass media 
(newspaper) texts in Mainland China, Hong Kong and the Chinese Diaspora, I attempt 
to examine whether online Chinese nationalism conforms better to the liberal-pluralist 
understanding of online Chinese nationalism or to the culturalist interpretation, and by 
extension whether the Internet will in fact bring about the end of nationalism or 
somehow transform nationalism, giving it new characteristics. 
Modelled after Lee et al's (2002) study of mass media framing of global news events 
which shows that mass media interpretations continue to reflect and serve the dominant 
interests of national elites, this study examines the national discursive frames used to 
interpret the September 11出 attacks, a highly politicised global event which evoked a 
variety of strong and divergent views by Chinese regarding its Others — Americans and 
Arabs. 
While the national frames used in the print media reflect the dominant ideology of each 
of the sites sampled, reproducing the results found by Lee et al (2002), I find that online 
interpretations of the event by Chinese netizens diverged from the dominant mass 
media themes in Mainland China, Hong Kong and in the West. I argue that these 
divergent interpretations of the September 11th attacks are based upon divergent 
discourses of the Chinese nation and whereas the mass media frames in these places 
tend to interpret events according to the interests of the reigning political elite - an 
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authoritarian elite in the Mainland, a post-colonial capitalist elite in Hong Kong and an 
Orientalist establishment in the (post)imperialist West, online interpretations of 
September 1 a r e based upon a transnational and populist discourse marginalised in 
the mass media of all three places. 
This online nationalist discourse contradicts the liberal-pluralist model of the Internet 
and nationalism on two points and provides support to the alternative culturalist model. 
Firstly, rather than reflecting the domination of state elites, online Chinese nationalism 
is a transnational and populist movement that subscribes to ideological positions often 
deeply opposed to the ideological positions adopted by state's official nationalism. 
Moreover, state elites' disapproval of the Chinese nationalism advocated online can be 
seen by the fact that it is often marginalised in the media and ignored by state elites who 
also sometimes actively suppress it. 
Secondly, rather than be antithetical to capitalist and civic values as is assumed by the 
liberal-pluralist model, online Chinese nationalism hybridizes traditional Chinese 
cultural discourses with modem civic and capitalist ideologies. Hence, although this 
nationalism sees China (or Greater China) as a nation built upon ancient Confucian 
culture and values, these values justify resistance against Communist Chinese and 
Western states as well as democratic and free market ideology. Moreover, this 
discourse takes pride in China's rapid economic development and rising national power, 
viewing indigenous cultural values as the reason for China's rising national power. 
Moreover, while the discovery of an alternative online discourse of Chinese nation that 
is ignored by the ruling parties and the mass media may appear to be inconsequential, 
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saying little about the Internet's potential to revolutionise the geopolitical landscape, I 
show that the political forums in which this otherwise inconsequential nationalism is 
discussed and disseminated provides the focal point for rallying individuals and groups 
around material political action and this has prompted global political solidarities and 
highly visible political movements against discrimination of Chinese in Indonesia in 
1998 and elsewhere (lay, 1998). 
Hence, rather than spell the end of national identity, the Internet's ability to enable a 
diversity of voices and to allow a diverse audience to rally around these voices 
empowers new and previously suppressed political factions to not only challenge the 
dominant mass mediated state-nationalisms but to advocate new nationalisms unique to 
and increasingly wired world. 
The Case 
Lee et al (2002) find that even in the age of global media, mass media interpretations of 
news events run along the weary borders of the nation-state. In this study, I adapt Lee et 
al's (2002) framework to test whether the national frames adopted online conform to 
liberal-pluralist or culturalist descriptions. 
After comparing mediated discourse regarding the September 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center in Mainland China, Hong Kong and the West with the online 
discourse of Chinese living in these regions, I find that while the mass-mediated 
interpretations of the attacks are as Lee et al's (2002) study predicted, the discourses of 
nation that were used to interpret the September attacks were different - and I 
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referred to it as a populist transnational national identity. This Greater Chinese 
national identity is populist because it is advocated by a large following of people 
unrelated to the centre of state power and because it has been either ignored or 
discouraged by state elites (Uhalley, 1994). Furthermore, it is transnational because its 
members and its concept of citizenship include people living under many state regimes. 
This national discourse finds its roots in narratives of Chinese cultural superiority and 
this narrative is combined with a variety of modem capitalist narratives such as the 
economic notion of Greater China and Lee Kuan Yew's much touted 'Asian Values' 
and imagines China as a once powerful civilisation, morally and culturally superior 
from other ‘barbarian’ races and although humiliated in modem times, that will through 
its adherence to Chinese culture, recover its former glory as the dominant economic and 
cultural power. 
Furthermore, the discourse is based upon notions of ethnicity and common culture and 
differs from and even opposes the national identity sponsored by the Chinese 
Communist Party and while the Chinese state-sponsored national identity found in the 
state-controlled press views the formation of a multiethnic People's Republic as the 
culmination of 5000 years of Chinese history, the Greater Chinese discourse examined 
in this study is not restricted to the geographical limits of the PRC but at the same time 
is less tolerant of ethnic difference, viewing non-Han Chinese suspiciously. Rather 
than view the ruling Chinese Communist Party as the hope of the Chinese people, the 
populist transnational identity of Greater China is at best ambivalent about the current 
regime and often romanticises about a pre-modem China which represents traditional 
Confucian values that could provide for a future Chinese renaissance based on revival 
ideologies such as Asian Values. 
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Definitions 
This study uses the widely used terms 'nation', 'national identity', 'nationalism', 
'discourse of nation', 'state' and ‘civil society' whose specifics continue to be disputed 
by different authors and different sub-disciplines and hence, should be laid out and 
defined clearly at the beginning. 
‘Nation’ here is defined as an "imagined community" or "imagined political 
community" (Anderson, 1991:6-7). Anderson defines an imagined community as 1. 
Imagined 一 because members of this community will never know of all of its members 
and hence imagines the existence of the community; 2. Limited — the nation is always 
limited to a subset of the entirety of humankind, there are those that belong within the 
community and those Others that belong outside; 3. Sovereign - nations are free agents 
that can determine their own destiny; 4. A community — nations are imagined as a 
horizontal, egalitarian relationship between a group of people. Note here that, contrary 
to other popular definitions, a nation does not necessarily define itself as bounded 
within a well-defined territory nor does it necessarily wish for political representation 
through the formation of a state. 
'National Identity', 'Nationalism' or 'Discourse of Nation' tend to be used 
interchangeably and is used to refer to an idea, an ideology or a movement (Delanty in 
Ritzer and Smart, 2001). Here, I adopt a more culturalist description of identity and 
define national identity as a narrative shared by a group of people considering 
themselves as a nation and that defines the group's history, traditions, values and 
territory. While nations are often seen to be defined by a single national identity, this 
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study sees nations as contested, being fought over by different groups seeking to define 
the nation using one of a number of national identities. 
'State' refers to a political and administrative entity that claims ‘‘monopoly over the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber in Guibemau 
243:2001). The state is a highly visible institution that is often defined in opposition to 
the notion of 'civil society' - the part of human society that operates apart from the 
state. 
'Civil Society' refers to the sphere of social life that characterises free association in 
cultural and economic activity, in contradistinction to the state, which relies on 
coercion. The exact boundaries of civil society differ amongst definitions and some 
define civil society as everything existing outside of the state while others define civil 
society as excluding the business world or even excluding all institutionalised activity. 
Here, civil society is defined as "the domestic world, the economic sphere, cultural 
activities and political interaction — which are organized by private or voluntary 
arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct control of the state." 
(Held, 1987:281) 
Objective and Research Question 
This study compares nationalist discourses use to frame global news events online with 
those in the print media over a three diverse institutional environments. This is done 
with several objectives in mind. Firstly, I seek to provide evidence to refute the notion 
that the Internet will bring about the end of national identity. I also address the notion 
that findings of online national identity necessarily mean the extension of state 
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hegemony. Furthermore, rather than to adopt the liberal-pluralist view and see the 
relationship between the Internet and nationalism as antithetical, I wish to examine this 
relationship empirically. In this regard, a comparative study is carried out with the aim 
of bringing out the differences between the nature of national discourses in the mass 
media and on the Internet so that we can see in what ways the Internet may potentially 
change the nature of nations and national identity. This research regime can be stated 
as follows: 
While the liberal-pluralist view argued that the Internet would herald 
the end of national identity, nationalist discourses continue to exist and 
in fact permeate online political communication. While studies have 
seen the relationship between national identity and the Internet through 
the trope of the battle between civil society and state, this study seeks a 
re-evaluation of this relationship and reassesses the question: What is 
the relationship between the Internet and national identity? 
Significance 
I have identified several major intersections of my research with established questions 
within the social sciences:-
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Figure 1. Research Significance 
/ Internet \ 
( / \ ) 
\ I \ 
\ National Identity - ~ • Civil Society / 
Globalization 
Internet, Civil Society and National Identity 
The Internet was seen by liberal-pluralists as having the potential to bring down state, 
nation and national identity and bring about a new, global civil society based upon free 
and rational debate. However, empirical studies show that while the Internet is able to 
foster global networks and bolster civil society, it also seems to be a hotbed for 
nationalist sentiments and political movements. This finding confounds our prevailing 
understanding of the relationship between new media technology, civil society and 
nationalism and hence, this research contributes to literature concerning the 
relationship between these three phenomena. 
Globalization, New Media and Cultural Change 
The literature on the social and cultural effects of new media technologies ties in 
closely with the literature on cultural globalization. In particular, the question of the 
future of nations and national identity in a globalized world is a much talked about topic 
and this study contributes to the literature on cultural globalisation, especially where it 
is concerned with the effect of globalizing technologies on the fate of nations and other 
traditional social solidarities and the potential rise of new social structures to replace 
them. 
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The Liberal Narrative for the End of Nations 
The recent changes in our society referred together as globalisation, brought about by 
global trade, travel, and communications have been interpreted in a number of ways. In 
particular, it is the global spread of culture — ideas, propaganda, cultural practices and 
beliefs brought about by these global flows which have attracted considerable attention 
from intellectuals and given the importance paid to this global flow of ideas, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that there have been a variety of interpretations and as many 
variations of these major interpretations as there are writers. Among the myriad 
academic narratives that exist to explain our newfound cultural phenomenon many of 
them prophesise the decline of the nation's role as the most prevalent and important 
cultural and political institution. 
Of these myriad scholarly narratives, the liberal-pluralist narrative remains perhaps the 
most popular and politically-powerful narrative. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
attempt to critically review this liberal-pluralist narrative. Firstly I will explicate the 
liberal-pluralist's core logic behind the predicted downfall of national identity. 
Secondly, I will seek to uncover the core assumptions about nations and national 
identity held by this narrative and argue that these assumptions should be questioned. 
Finally, based upon this critical review, I will identify a research gap, which I attempt to 
address in the following chapter. 
The Liberal-Pluralist Logic: An Overview 
The liberal-pluralist logic predicting the Internet's role in the demise of national 
identity can be summarised in a simple schematic as shown in Figure 1 • 
14 
Figure 1. Schematic of Liberal-Pluralist Logic 
, Internet 
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Values 5. Antagonistic 
Relationship 
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The schematic in Figure 1 highlights the major claims and assumptions that lie behind 
the notion that the Internet will lead to the end of national identity. In the first section of 
this chapter, we review the literature that makes the claims that: a. the Internet supports 
and strengthens civil society and its values (statements 1 and 3 of Figure 1); b. the 
Internet challenges the hegemony of the state and national identity, which is instigated 
by the state (2 and 4) and; c. that civil society and civic and capitalist values are 
incongruent with nations and national identity (5). In the second section, we critique 
two of these core statements, namely that national identity is necessarily constructed by 
the state or that findings of online nationalism is evidence of state hegemony being 
extended online (4) and that nationalism is necessarily antithetical to civil society and 
civic and capitalist ideologies (5). 
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"The Control Revolution": from State to Individual 
The role of media institutions in the redistribution of power between the state and civil 
society is a classic theme in the social sciences and since the beginning of electronic 
communication in the 1960's, beginning with Marshall McLuhan (1964), scholars have 
been concerned with how the non-traditional nature of new media networks would 
bring about unprecedented social change. 
The aspect that made new communications technologies of such interest to McLuhan 
and countless scholars after him, was the potential for the decentralisation of political 
power that would place the Internet's revolutionary social potential in line with that of 
the Gutenberg press that fuelled the fall of the Holy Roman Catholic Empire and that 
brought about the rise of the nation-state (Anderson, 1983). The subject of the new 
media's revolutionary potential was taken up by Ithiel de Sola Pool who described 
these new communication technologies as 'Technologies of Freedom' (Pool, 1983). 
Pool believed that while such technologies of freedom did not guarantee freedom, they 
had the potential to allow for unprecedented political freedom and democracy (Pool, 
1983 and 1990). 
The Internet, Civil Society and the State 
"The pyramidal structure., .cannot withstand the speed of the telephone 
to bypass all the hierarchical arrangements." (McLuhan 1964:238 in 
Pool 1990:63). 
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This quotation of McLuhan by Pool outlines the logic behind Pool's predictions of 
liberalising effects of new media technologies, which argues that new media's ability to 
support non-hierarchical networks would lead to political decentralisation. Since this 
prediction by McLuhan and Pool in the 1960's and 1980’s，the development of the 
World Wide Web in the 1990，s has popularised the once obscure academic and military 
communication experiment known as the Internet and since then, a large grouping of 
liberal-pluralist scholars have followed the seminal work of McLuhan and Pool and 
sought to explore the Internet's emancipating potential against the state, particularly 
those states deemed to be authoritarian. Such liberal-pluralist scholars have since 
elaborated McLuhan and Pool's theory of how the Internet will lead to the 
strengthening of civil society and its values and accordingly, the weakening of the state 
as a political force based on the concepts of non-hierarchicality (or interactivity) and 
globality. 
In his study of the Internet in soft-authoritarian Singapore, Rodan (1998) claims that 
non-hierarchicality or interactivity enables both 'ideational plurality' and the formation 
of civil society organisations and Boas and Kalathil (2001) and Mclntyre (1997) 
explain that this is the effect of the Internet's ability to allow individuals to bypass 
government control of messages hence easing the flow of information between 
individuals, and particularly dissidents. The freedom to engage in political 
communication outside of the control of the state constitutes the building blocks for the 
formation of organisations both existing and advocating political values independently 
of the state. 
While the Internet's network structure is thought to facilitate the strengthening of civil 
society, and by definition, constrict the ambit of the state, Rodan states that the 
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Internet's globality poses a special challenge to authoritarian states. By allowing news 
about events in such authoritarian regimes to escape state control, the Internet can also 
work to inform liberal governments, global rights groups and foreign capitalists about 
problems and abuses in such countries, increasing the pressure by these regimes to 
address their shortcomings and thereby exposing authoritarian governments to the 
pressure of the global standards set by powerful liberal countries such as the United 
States (Boas and Kalathil, 2001; Mclntryre, 1997; Rodan, 1998). Considered together, 
the Internet's global spread and network architecture makes the Internet transnational, 
penetrating above and below the borders of the state. 
This liberal-pluralist logic that claims that new communications technology is a boon 
for civil society and a hindrance for the state can perhaps be encapsulated in Shapiro's 
(1999) pithy phrase "Control Revolution". Shapiro (1999) believes that new 
communication technology will transfer power from institutions to individuals and 
bring about revolutionary change to our lives. 
The Internet, Civic Values and Nationalism 
The claim that the Internet will strengthen civil society at the expense of the nation and 
state is often extended to include the values and ideologies associated with these 
respective institutions. 
For many scholars, the strengthening of civil societal institutions implies the 
strengthening of both civic values of freedom and democracy and capitalist values of 
free market economics. For example, Chandhoke (1995:180) writes that the 
development of civil society brings about rise of liberal values in which political 
self-determination and economic freedom of choice are the core values. 
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Internet scholars have argued that the Internet will boost both of these values. Taubman 
(1998) notes that the Internet's ability to allow social networks and organisations 
outside of those mandated by the state, i.e. civil society, is the basis for the maintenance 
of liberal democracy against the state. Furthermore, Boas and Kalathil (2001) note that 
the Internet does not only organise people around political causes and bring about the 
creation of civil society organisations, but it also has the potential to weaken state 
mercantilism and facilitate free economic exchange. This free organisation of people 
around economic goals nourishes an economic middle class that forms a base vital to 
the prolonged survival of civil society and its ideological superstructure. 
Likewise, the rise of global communications systems and the weakening of the state's 
role in communications networks are seen as leading to the end of nationalism and 
certainly, not a few commentators have "proclaimed an impending "end of the national 
project" (Scholte, 2000). For example, Martin Albrow argues that globalization, in 
which he includes the global communications system, represents the greatest challenge 
yet to the nation-state and that "globalism rather than nationalism is the characteristic 
politics of the new age" (Albrow, 1996:140). However, perhaps the boldest and most 
public advocate of the view that nationalism and national identity will be wiped away 
by the Internet comes from the much-quoted Nicholas Negroponte, who claims: 
"Twenty years from now, children who are used to finding out about 
other countries through the click of a mouse are not going to know what 
nationalism is." (Nicholas Negroponte in CNN Interactive, Nov 
I 9 9 7 I ) 
1 http://edition.cnn.com/TECH/9711/25/intemet.peace.reut/ 
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Taubman (1998) elaborates on the logic of the demise of nationalism and argues that 
the mass of diverse online content from all over the world coupled with the Internet's 
transnationality provides the Internet with 'ideational plurality'. By introducing 
'ideational plurality', which suggests the existence of a wide range of competing views 
and interpretations, the Internet would weaken the state's hegemonic power to interpret 
global events. This would lead to a weakening of the state's ability to maintain support 
for its policies as well as to dictate and homogenise cultural narratives over its territory, 
leading to both the end of the state's political power and the nation's cultural coherence. 
Evidence of the ability of new communications technology to subvert the hegemony of 
the state, strengthen democracy and dent the state's ability to define the discourse of 
nation has often centred on work on wired authoritarian states. Such studies, which 
attracted much attention from both liberal scholars and the American popular press, 
suggest that netizens in authoritarian states have been able to use "decentralized 
electronic technologies" (De Vaney et al, 2000) such as the Internet to facilitate civic 
discourse and organise resistance against the state, often pointing to successful 
resistance stories by democracy and independence activists in China, Burma and also 
Africa and the Middle East (e.g. De Vaney et al, 2000; Huang et al, 1997; and Kluver 
and Powers, 1999) 
The Public Sphere: Civic Values vs National Identity 
While the association of civic values with civil society and the association of national 
identity with the state have, in the minds of most commentators, placed nations and 
national identity at odds with the civic values, the supposed incompatibility between 
civic values and nationalism is backed by a long scholarly tradition that sees these two 
20 
ideological constructs as antithetical. This oppositional relationship has been 
documented by a number of writers and Nodia (2001:384) sees the opposition as being 
one of rationality against irrationality, stating that democracy is seen to be rational, 
while nationalism is seen as irrational. Chandhoke notes that this dichotomy between 
rational democracy and irrational nationalism "is anchored in a dichotomy central to 
modem sociology, that between community and society ... [and] of tradition and 
modernity" (Mamdani 1993:43 in Chandhoke, 1995:180). 
This philosophical and historical bifurcation of nationalism and civic values into 
irrational and rational, traditional and modem is best seen in Habermas' concept of the 
'public sphere', which is employed in not a few studies of the effect of political 
communication on the Internet (e.g. Fung and Kedl, 2001; Kuan, 2001) 
Habermas' (1991 [1962]) notion of the public sphere is considered to be the 
philosophical basis and theoretical ideal for civil society (McNair 1995:14; Kahan 
1999:29) and is based upon Habermas' historical accounts of the development in 
century Europe, of a political communicative space independent of the state. Habermas 
(2001 [1974]) defines the public sphere as a space in which there is no control of 
dissenting opinions, where ideas are rational and informed and participants contribute 
equally without considerations of race, gender, class or nationality and without 
coercion. It both guarantees access to all citizens and guarantees their freedom to 
express their opinions. These opinions are tested and debated in the public sphere and 
result in the formation of 'public opinion' - which is rational and in contrast to the 
irrationality of "cultural assumptions, normative attitudes, and collective prejudices 
and values" (Habermas, 2001 [1974]: 510). Hence, within the public sphere, there is 
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little place for the exclusionary practices and 'irrational' cultural assumptions and 
prejudices that define nationalism and national identity. 
This opposition between civic values and nationalism rises then, to an almost 
tautological level and this brings Hall (1995:12) to note that regardless of whether 
nationalism strengthens or subverts states, it is always opposed to civil society. Hence, 
the opposition between nationalism and civic values is claimed to be fundamental, and 
is logically independent of the oppositional relationship between their respective 
structural bases. 
Nationalism According to the Liberal-Pluralist: Two Critiques 
The Role of the State 
The first of the two liberal-pluralist assumptions that I review and critique here is the 
assumption that the nation is the product of state control. Such a view appears to be 
rooted in classic liberal-pluralist literature which sees the state as the defender of 
irrational conservative values such as gemeinschaft, cronyism and economic 
mercantilism and nationalism in opposition to the rational progressive values of 
gesellschaft, free trade, liberal democracy. Indeed the state is often assumed to be the 
sole producer of nationalist discourse and Luke writes: 
"National community follows state sovereignty as governments 
preoccupy themselves writing and/or drawing lines of communal 
identity and antagonism on the Earth. Since 1648, nation-states have 
been those legitimate monopolies of violence charged with enscribing, 
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discursively and coercively, writs of communal difference." (Luke, 
1995:875-876) 
This manner of thinking has shown itself in liberal-pluralist explanations of online 
national identity and in one study of online Chinese national identity, the phenomenon 
was claimed to be the effect of both Chinese Internet censorship policies ensuring that 
posts were pro-Chinese and the state's effective co-optation of the young male 
university students who made up the majority of Internet users at the time (Qiu, 2000). 
However, while Qiu (2000) blames the Chinese government for censoring 
anti-govemment and anti-nationalist posts, in fact, it has actually been the policy of the 
Chinese government to also censor what it considers to be inappropriately nationalist 
comments. Furthermore, by attributing the prevalence of Chinese nationalism to a 
co-opted elite, Qiu (2000) implies, without substantiation that Chinese nationalism has 
no popular dimension. However, such a claim is in contradiction to a growing body of 
work which demonstrates that China's new nationalism is increasingly characterised by 
populism rather than state-led nationalism (Gries, 2004). 
Hence, while the state may have historically been the root of nationalism and certainly, 
nationalism is historically associated with state nation-building projects and 
"territorially bound commercial and industrial capitalism" (Scholte, 2000:162), state 
and nationalist discourse cannot simply be assumed to be always coterminous, lest the 
two be conflated. Rather, in modem times, the role of the state is often absent or 
antagonistic to nationalist discourses and nations are often constructed by civil society, 
surviving without and despite the existence of the state rather than because of it. 
Nations without a State 
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Clearly, the idea that contemporary nations and national identity are always or even 
primarily the result of state-led nation building must be due for an overhaul and a 
number of contemporary studies of national identity suggests that imagined community 
may exist without a state or even in the face of powerful state opposition. 
In fact, nations may exist and persist without states at all and diasporic peoples such as 
the Jews have been able to survive as an imagined community for almost two millennia 
after the loss of their state. The Jews, although constituting a paradigmatic case are 
barely unique and Bakker's (2000) study of Kurdish, Macedonian and Armenian 
nationalist websites remind us that diasporic nations can continue to reproduce their 
national identity despite the lack of any state institutions. 
Nations against the State 
Nonetheless, the case of nations surviving without a state does not constitute the most 
extreme scenario for the tenacity of national communities. Goldstein's (1990) along 
with Dominguez's (1990) study of Iranian or Eastern Jews living in Israel illustrate how 
grassroots nations may in fact survive outright opposition from state elites that attempt 
to rewrite the nation through nation-building efforts. 
Dominguez (1990) describes a case in which Eastern Jews have resisted the 
overwhelming state hegemony resulting from nation-building efforts by the 
increasingly secular ruling class. Coming from a Westernised background, the ruling 
Western Jews held power in the early years of modem Israel and enforced the ideology 
of a westernised and secular national culture through compulsory education, housing, 
language health production, dress and so on, becoming entirely ubiquitous, hegemonic 
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and instrumental, with the state deliberately using the educational system as a project to 
create a national identity (Dominguez, 1990:133). 
However, despite these determined ideological efforts, Goldstein's (1990) shows the 
fragility of state hegemony and documents how even benign cultural practices such as 
ethnic migrant theatre can suddenly erupt to become an ideological challenge to the 
Israeli state's discourse of nation. Goldstein traces the popular comedy of the fictional 
character Mulla Daoud who represents the difficulties of rural Iranian Jews in adapting 
to a modem, secular Israel. Goldstein finds that while the story of Mulla Daoud began 
as a politically inert tale of migrant difficulties, as a result of the politics of the 
Lebanese war, the tale of Mulla Daoud was adapted to play a more politically 
subversive role in which Daoud was mistaken by Israeli authorities as a Lebanese 
terrorist. This new story was then interpreted to be a critique of the state's unspoken 
assumptions of the nation as exclusive to Western Jews and exclusive of Eastern Jews, 
including those from Iran. Goldstein's study shows the readiness of non-state 
institutions, in this case Iranian ethnic theatre, to assume subversive political meaning 
when the state institutions and its dominant national discourse fail to accommodate 
pertinent social issues. Hence, from Goldstein's study, we can see that civil society 
organisations are often equally likely to be the site for constructing nationalist discourse 
as is the state demonstrating that the state is only one of many ideological competitors 
fighting for the control of nationalist discourse. 
Online Nations: Nations despite the State 
Studies of online discourses of national identity provide further doubt to theories that 
exclusively see nations as state-instigated and recent studies of online discourses of 
national identity provide evidence to suggest instead, that the main form of online 
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national identity is a populist nationalism that is ambivalent to and differs from those 
nationalisms propounded by dominant state elites. 
Empirical evidence to this effect has been found for a diverse range of online 
nationalisms. A survey of nationalist discourse in India finds that rather than reflect the 
modernist India's Ghandian discourse of the nation, discourses of India found on the 
Internet advocate a deterritorialised Hindu imaginary that is often in hostile opposition 
to the secular modernism of the Indian state (Sundaram, 2000). Duque's (2001) work 
on Colombia recognizes the importance of new media in providing a space to redefine 
national identity and sees the Internet as a way to resist US media representations of the 
Colombia as the 'drug war’ nation, which has been the cause of misguided US and 
Colombian state policies and has resulted in countless Colombian deaths. Duque (2001) 
believes that the creation of websites and online events might act to counteract US 
hegemony and give power to local civil society to redefine the discourses of Colombia. 
Other studies of online nations present similar challenges to the assumption of 
state-instigated nationalism and shows, rather, the salience of civil society in the 
construction of online nationalist discourse (e.g. Bakker, 2000; Mills, 2002) 
The evidence presented here suggests then, that while the concept of nations 
constructed and sustained by state-led nation building efforts may have been the most 
historically salient, the role of the state in the construction of nationalist discourse can 
no longer be assumed. Instead, alternative explanations for national identity that place 
less emphasis on the role of the state and more emphasis on the role of populist social 
movements may increasingly warrant consideration. 
The Relative Autonomy of Ideology vis-a-vis Political Structure 
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Even in cases where nationalist discourses are the product of state institutions, such 
discourses do not necessarily serve to justify state hegemony, which is an assumption 
often made by the liberal-pluralist view and such deterministic conceptions of the 
relationship between institutional power and ideology have been a problematic 
characteristic of structuralist theories to which the liberal-pluralist political economy 
discussed belongs. This theoretical position that assumes a functional relationship 
between institutional power and ideology, however, is disputed by so-called 
postmodern accounts of the workings of discourse. Postmodernists argue for the 
relative autonomy of culture vis-a-vis social structure and Michel Foucault, arguably 
the father of postmodernist paradigm and original proponent of the modem notion of 
discourse notes: 
"Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up 
against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowance for 
the concept's complex and unstable process whereby discourse can 
be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a 
stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile 
and makes it possible to thwart it." (Foucault, 1980, emphasis added). 
Foucault's observation is backed up by current work on the institutions of national 
identity and an excellent study that shows the ambivalence between state institution and 
discourse is Vedery's (1990) historical account of how the state's academic and 
political institutions created the Romanian nation and Vedery argues that while it was 
the state was responsible for establishing the education institutions, cultural 
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organisations, archives and museums in which the concept of the Romanian nation was 
conceived, it was the academics and personalities within these institutions that created 
the national ideology by reifying the nation through their extensive works on the 
subject. Most importantly, while Vedery's (1990) study testifies to the state's ability to 
produce nationalist discourse, this discourse did not necessarily legitimate the power of 
the state and often challenged the legitimacy of the state's policies. Hence, Vedery's 
(1990) study suggests that the relationship that exists between the state and the national 
discourse it produces is better described by Foucault's (1980) claim of ambivalence 
rather than the claim that culture always supports and reproduces the institutions that 
create it. 
The Nation as Anti-Modern 
The second claim that warrants critical review is the widely-held notion that 
nationalism is antithetical to modem liberal values of civil and capitalist society, and 
indeed it is not only the liberal-pluralists, but also the Marxists who claim "that the 
proletarians have no fatherland" and that "all that is solid, melts into air, all that is holy 
is profaned" (Marx 1967:51-52 in Avineri, 1994:28) who are guilty of prematurely 
writing off the power of nationalism (Avineri, 1994:28). 
While nationalism is seen as incongruent with the values of liberal individualism of 
civil society, the historical reality is the traditional gemeinschaft of national identity and 
the modem gessellschaft of civil society have always been inextricably tied. 
While liberal values are seen as rational and nationalism is seen as irrational, Nodia 
(2001:385) claims that because liberal democracies always rely on notions of 
citizenship and polity that are defined by national discourses, democracy is as irrational 
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as the nationalism on which it is based. The parallel argument is made by Nikolas 
(2000) whose analysis of civic and ethnic nationalism demonstrates that every 
nationalist movement contains discursive elements that could be considered civic. 
The coexistence of "modem" civil society and "pre-modem" ethnic association is also 
to be found in contemporary cyberspace. In numerous studies of online political 
discourse, we find that although the requirements of anonymity and significant absence 
of coercion are achieved to a degree unmatched by real-life forums, Fung and Kedl 
(2001) find that rather than achieving the rationality and equality of Habermas' ideal 
speech situation, the anonymity and lack of coercion of online forums actually enable 
participants to behave 'irrationally' - allowing speakers to be abusive, partisan and 
bigoted without the reproach that would come from real-life political forums. This 
implies the existence of a liberal environment and liberal values may be a catalyst 
rather than an inhibitor to nationalist discourse. 
Gellner (1995) also supports the argument that civic and nationalist discourses can and 
do coexist but goes another step further to claim that civic values and nationalism are 
not only discursively inseparable, but that the homogenisation of culture by the state, 
which is widely held to be the root of nationalism, is also a necessary requirement for 
the creation of civil society. Gellner (1995) argues that national identity was a 
necessary step for the achievement of modem civil society through the creation of the 
'modular man'. This modular man, who represents the quintessential liberal man, free 
to enter into associations as he pleases, is created by the state, through the centralisation 
and homogenising of education for the purposes of creating a homogenously educated 
workforce in which individual members become interchangeable. However, this same 
homogenisation of culture is also precisely the institutional basis for the 
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territorialization of culture and hence nationalism. In Gellner's own words, 
"Modularity makes civil society possible, but also makes it nationalist" (Gellner, 
1995:77). Gellner's view is historically convincing and even Francis Fukuyama, 
famous for his book titled The End of History and the Last Man (1992), in which he 
prematurely celebrates the global victory of liberal values and who holds to the view 
that nationalism and civic values are logically opposed, admits that "it is very hard to 
imagine stable democracies existing outside of these national contexts" (Fukuyama, 
1994:24). 
While some saw the nation and national identity as the enemy to the civic values of 
freedom and democracy, other commentators saw the nation as an obstacle to free trade. 
This dichotomisation of capitalism and nationalism is strongest in the Marxist tradition, 
but is no less salient in the liberal-pluralist literature where the dichotomy of 
laissez-faire capitalism versus the protectionism and mercantilism of the nation-state 
traces its legacy all the way back to Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations. 
In modem writings however, perhaps Kenichi Ohmae's (1999) "The End of the Nation 
State" is most representative of how proponents of global capitalism view the nation. 
Ohmae claims that while the nation-state was once powerful during the mercantilist 
phase of the world economy, in the present time "nation-states have become little more 
than bit actors" (Ohmae, 1999: 207). Ohniae, who repeats Smith's laissez-faire mantra 
that the citizens of economically open countries enjoy better welfare, is also scathing in 
his remarks about the nations and nationalism which he refers to as "jingoistic 
celebration of nationhood that places far more value on emotion-grabbing symbols than 
on real, concrete improvements in quality of life." (Ohmae 1999:207). 
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Furthermore, Benjamin Barber uses the illustrative metaphors of 'Jihad' and 
‘McWorld’ to represent the forces of ethnic nationalism and global capitalism: 
“…Jihad and Mc World ...appear so intractably antithetical...[thoy] 
operate with equal strength in opposite directions, the one driven by 
parochial hatreds, the other by universalizing markets, the one 
re-creating ancient subnational and ethnic borders from within, the 
other making national borders porous from without." (Barber, 
1995:23 [emphasis added]) 
However, Barber among others, go on to show that while Jihad and McWorld often 
appear antithetical, the two forces are instead, often dialectical and mutually supporting 
and Barber (1995:5) notes that "Jihad not only revolts against but abets McWorld, 
while McWorld not only imperils but re-creates and reinforces Jihad". Both Mann and 
Scholte provide more concrete examples of this relationship and Mann (1997:479-480) 
points to capital's continued reliance on nations by noting that the nation-state is still a 
powerful force in creating economic networks and is relied on for things such as 
education and infrastructure. Furthermore, companies remain restricted by local laws 
and practices. On the other hand, Scholte (2000: 163) illustrates the dialectical 
relationship between nationalist and capitalist values and notes that while the success of 
national 'home grown' corporations leads to nationalist pride, nationalism is also the 
reason for state support for such corporations. 
Finally, in a further sign that the historical dichotomy between discourses of ethnic 
solidarity and discourse of capitalism is fading, Kotkin, who writes about the rising 
economic might of transnational ethnic network writes, “global tribes represent a 
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critical dynamic element - the historical protagonist — on the world economic stage. 
Where they appear, new combinations of technology, industry and culture flourish" 
(Kotkin, 1993:17). According to Kotkin, cultural solidarities, rather than present an 
impediment to global capitalist success, is now considered critical. 
Hence, while contemporary scholarship pits modem, rational capitalist and civic values 
against primordial, irrational national identity, studies of both historical real-life and 
contemporary online cases attest to the falsity of this binarism. Instead, national 
identity should not be seen as being the ideological or logical anti-thesis of civic and 
capitalist values, but rather, potentially conterminous. 
The Internet, Civil Society and Nationalism: An Alternative View 
In this chapter, I have presented both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
arguing that the relationship between nationalism and the Internet cannot simply be 
seen in terms of the opposition between state and civil society. Specifically, I have 
presented and critiqued the two assumptions behind this view. Firstly, I have critically 
reviewed the idea that the discourse of nationalism is necessarily related to state 
hegemony. Secondly, I have critiqued the idea that nationalism is necessarily 
incongruent with civic and capitalist values. 
The critiques of the liberal-pluralist understanding of the relationship between 
nationalism and the Internet reviewed in this chapter, leads us to a reconsideration of 
how to interpret the phenomenon of online Chinese nationalism. In the next chapter, I 
attempt an exploratory study of Chinese online nationalism in order to arrive at an 
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alternative understanding of Internet nationalism that avoids the shortcomings of the 
existing liberal-pluralist model. 
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Chinese Nationalism: A Case Study 
The Case 
In order to gain some insight regarding the relationship between the Internet and 
nationalist discourse, an exploratory case study was undertaken. As intimated in 
previous chapters the case study involves a discursive analysis of Chinese nationalist 
discourses on the Internet. 
The topic chosen and design of this case study was intended to provide us with an 
opportunity to contrast and benchmark this study against Lee et al's (2002) study of 
nationalist framing of global news events in the mass media. Lee et al (2002) was able 
to show that nationalist frames remain prominent in the mass media despite media 
globalisation and in order to provide a comparison and benchmark with their work, 
which was based upon a discursive analysis of different countries' television and 
newspaper reports of Hong Kong's return to China in 1997,1 have opted to emulate and 
extend their approach for my study of nationalist discourse in the new media. 
While the rise of online nationalist phenomena and my study of it came too late to take 
advantage of the 1997 return of Hong Kong to the People's Republic, the study did 
coincide with a global event of gigantic proportions that not only was interpreted along 
national(ist) lines in many countries but was also widely discussed on the Internet. 
To this end, an analysis of newspaper and online messages surrounding the September 
11^ 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center was conducted. A study using the 
September 1 ”卜 discourses was used because it was a highly politicised and global news 
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event that attracted attention and strong opinions from a large number of people. The 
importance of this global event ensured that sufficient online and print media samples 
existed and that opinions were sufficiently strong that underlying ideological positions 
and their differences would be more salient. Certainly, the contested nature of national 
narratives was nowhere more apparent than in both Chinese and American public 
discourse in the aftermath of the September 1 a t t a c k s on the World Trade Centre in 
New York. 
For Americans and those with access to American media were confronted daily with 
politicians and celebrities confirming the chosenness of the American people and they 
interpreted the bombing as an attack on freedom itself. Alternatives to the dominant 
interpretation of events were met with a harsh response in the American mass media. 
On the other hand, while the trauma of September 11 was largely able to suppress 
subaltern discourses of American national identity in Washington's favour, 
interpretations of the event differed widely in the Chinese public sphere. Mass 
mediated reporting of the September attacks in Hong Kong, Mainland China and 
the West ranged from subdued to openly supportive of the American interpretation of 
events. Nonetheless, for the large part, online discourses in Hong Kong, China and in 
the Chinese Diaspora were highly critical of the United States. This mismatch between 
interpretations in the mass media and the Internet suggests a significant difference 
between online and newsprint discourses of nation 
Hence, because of the diversity of frames used to interpret the September 1 a t t a c k s , a 
discourse analysis of the attacks served as an effective discursive site on which to 
uncover the different discourses of Chineseness employed in the interpretation of 
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global political events. This in turn allows us to better discern whether the online 
discourses of Chinese nation employed serve as ideological support to the ruling elites 
as assumed by liberal-pluralist models of online nationalism or in fact have a more 
complex relationship with the state. 
Sampling Methodology 
Both online and mass media discourse of the September attacks were sampled in 
three locations for a total sample of six sites. Figure 1 shows a summary table of sites 
surveyed for discourse analysis. 
Mainland Chinese Hong Kong Chinese Diasporic Chinese / West 
Online Qiangguo Luntan (Iweek) Yahoo (HK) World Huaren Federation 
Netease Uzone21 Chinese Community 
Forum / China News 
Digest 
MediatedMainland Chinese Hong Kong US, British, Australian, 
Newspapers Newspapers Canadian and New 
Zealand Newspapers 
Figure 1. Sites sampled using discourse analysis 
The above sampling grid shown in Figure 1 was employed for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, both online and mass media samples were collected rather than online samples 
only in order to enable comparison between nationalism found in the mass media with 
that found on the Internet. While this does not appear to have a direct relationship with 
the research question, doing this provides a baseline control group which can be used to 
benchmark with Lee et al's (2002) study of nationalist framing in the mass media. This 
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helps to ensure that the results of this study are comparable with that in other literature 
and not idiosyncratic to the September 1 i s s u e or to other unconsidered factors. 
Secondly, our sampling scheme was extended into a total of three geographic sites for a 
number of reasons. A schema of three geographic sites "Mainland China", "Hong 
Kong" and the "Chinese Diaspora in the West" was chosen because the three sites 
represent three different cultural communities with varying patterns of language, mass 
media consumption and government regime but who nevertheless share some notion of 
being Chinese. It should be pointed out that this categorisation does not run strictly 
along political boundaries and while Mainland China and Hong Kong are (for our 
purposes) quite clearly geographically defined, the fact that I have categorised English 
speaking Diasporic Chinese in a dozen Western countries into a single entity can be 
justified by the fact that they are connected culturally by a common language, mass 
media network, internet usage patterns, as well as allied political regimes based upon a 
common liberal democratic ideology. 
The primary objective of conducting the study in several countries was in order to 
elucidate the relationship between the state and nationalist framing. Whereas Lee et 
al's (2002) study showed that the 1997 return of Hong Kong to China was interpreted 
along physical national borders, which gave evidence to the state's role in framing mass 
media discourse, by observing whether online nationalist frames also run along national 
borders, we can gain some indication of the state's influence in online nationalist 
discourse. In addition, by extending the study over several areas, I was able to increase 
the generalisability of the study over a range of political-economic environments. 
Finally, surveying a number of sites helped to ensure that any differences detected 
between online and mass media samples in any one site was not due to the extension of 
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the hegemony of other elite state discourses in other sites. For example, it is entirely 
possible that online Chinese national identity found in Mainland China is an extension 
of Western Orientalist discourses of Chineseness rather than an extension of Chinese 
Communist discourse. In such a case, the differences between online and mass media 
discourses in Mainland China might need to be interpreted according to issues of say, 
imperialism rather than that of new media and authoritarian control. 
Mass Media Sampling 
Newspaper articles regarding September 1 w e r e surveyed in each of the three mass 
media sites. The mass media in Hong Kong and the Chinese Mainland were sampled 
from a large variety of newspapers archived by the Wisenews search engine which 
archives primarily Chinese language newspapers and magazines. Included among the 
sample of Hong Kong print media were articles from all the mainstream newspapers 
including Apple Daily (蘋果日報)，Oriental Daily (東方日報)，Ming Pao (明報）and 
other less popular but well-known newspapers such as the left-leaning Wen Wei Po (文 
匯幸艮）and Ta Kung Pao (大公幸艮).For the Mainland Chinese sample, both traditional 
state-owned and more populist newspapers that represent modem-day Mainland 
Chinese mass media ecology were included. State mouthpieces such as the People's 
Daily (人民日幸艮）and regional newspapers that source their news from Xinhua News 
Agency (新華社）represented traditional state-owned media while the Global Times 
(環球時幸S) and Southern Weekend (南方週末）represented the more controversial 
side of the Chinese mass media. 
From these newspapers, stories mentioning the September 11th attacks from Hong 
Kong (n=1476) and the Mainland (n=414) were sampled over a one month period from 
12 September 2001 to 12 October 2001. 
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In order to sample the mass media ecology in the West, a similar process was carried 
out using the Lexis-Nexis news archive. However, as we were particularly interested in 
how discourses of Chineseness intersected with the interpretation of September 
Western reports were filtered to include only those that contained the word "China" or 
"Chinese" (n=i38). 
In order to represent Western mass media, samples of English language newspapers 
and magazines in the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
for the same period were taken. These countries were selected to represent the West as 
they are home to the majority of Chinese Diaspora in the West and were particularly 
representative of the population found in Diasporic Chinese online forums. English 
news sources sampled were those of that commanded national and international 
audiences in the English speaking world and included the New York Times, Boston 
Globe, Guardian and the Sydney Morning Herald. 
For samples in all three sites, all relevant articles were taken regardless of genre or 
category (e.g. international news, editorial or entertainment news) as every type of 
news was considered to be potentially useful for revealing the national frames used to 
interpret September 11出. 
Online Media Sampling 
A slightly different approach was necessarily taken for the sampling of online content 
and a number of bulletin boards and email lists which have become focal points for 
discussing political issues in each of the three sites were sampled for content relating to 
September 
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In the Chinese Mainland, two well known and heavily used public bulletin boards were 
selected to represent both government-controlled and commercial sides of the 
Mainland Chinese cyberscape. 
Qiangguo Luntan or ''Strong Nation Forum“ (強國論壇)，a forum run on the People's 
Daily Website by the Xinhua News Agency and by far the most visible and frequently 
accessed political forum in China represented the Chinese Internet's state-controlled 
presence. The Qiangguo Luntan has been operating since 1999，when the People's 
Daily established a website for netizens to express their anger over the US bombing of 
the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia^. Since that time, it has remained a focal point for 
the expression of nationalist fervour and during times of international controversy can 
command thousands of messages per day. The forum's central position is both 
recognised and further consolidated in academic circles and messages from the forum 
are frequently quoted in both Chinese and foreign-based studies of the Internet in China. 
The Forum was sampled were sampled only for one week from 12 September to 19 
September rather than the standard one month sampling used in other samples and this 
was due to the fact that the forum administrators deleted many postings during that time. 
However, the shortened sampling time did not seem to pose any serious methodological 
issues as samples from other online forums, including the samples from the other 
Mainland Chinese forum seemed to be ideologically consistent across the life of the 
sample. This suggested that a shortened sampling period would not have any serious 
effect on the validity of the study. 
2 Kalathil, Shanthi. "Nationalism on the Net" Asian Wall Street Journal, Feburary 22, 2002 reprinted 
online at the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
[http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/kalathil_Bushtrip.asp?from=pubauthor] 
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To complement Qiangguo Luntan, Netease (網易)，was chosen to represent the 
commercial side of the Chinese Internet. Netease, established in 1997 is a well-known 
and very popular commercial portal and one of only two Chinese Internet portals to be 
listed on the NASDAQ (the other being the equally famous Sina.com). As of 
September 2003, Netease boasts one of the largest audiences of any internet portal in 
the world with 329 million daily page views, 144 million registered accounts and 55000 
simultaneous chatroom users]. 
While Hong Kong lacks both government and private forums that match the magnitude 
of those found in the Mainland, Hong Kong's strong commercial and civic sectors do 
provide public websites that encourage political debate. 
Uzone21 was chosen to represent the online presence of Hong Kong's civil society. 
Although not a mainstream website in terms of sheer volume, Uzone21, established in 
July 2000 by Breakthrough, a well-known Christian organisation that publishes its own 
youth magazine, hosts an active forum which encourages young Hong Kong netizens to 
become active in discussing social and political issues, especially those with 
implications to Christian lifestyle. 
Sina.com, which is also listed on the NASDAQ has a dominating presence in the Hong 
Kong alongside other popular internet portals such as Yahoo and Tom.com. Although 
it does not release figures about its Hong Kong operation, Sina claims to be "the 
3 "China-based Netease.com Issues IPO at Nasdaq" People 's Daily Online English Edition (Jul 1，2000) 
[fi3eng.peopledaily.com.cn/english/ 200007/0 l/eng2000070 l_44427.html] 
"Netease.com Inc. - About Us" [http://corp.163.com/eng/aboutus/aboutus.html] 
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leading" online media provider for global Chinese with over 80 million registered 
subscribers worldwide*. 
In contrast to the Mainland and Hong Kong Chinese, the thinly-spread Chinese 
Diaspora are less well served by government and commercial initiatives but 
nevertheless, the Chinese Diaspora belong to global civil networks that host some of 
the most active and passionate political forums In this study, two focal political sites 
are chosen for sampling. The first political site represent arguably the oldest and most 
established Chinese Diasporic forum on the Internet while the second site is a forum 
hosted by a newer, smaller but nonetheless very ambitious and influential social 
movement. 
The first and more venerable site sampled was the Chinese language Chinese News 
Digest, which publishes the CND Global Digest and the Hua Xia Wen Zhai (華夏文摘） 
as well as the once closely associated English language Chinese Community Forum 
(CCF), both of which are sites frequented by overseas Mainland Chinese students and 
scholars from a number of countries including Australia, Canada and the United States 
who originally established these two forums in March, 1989 with 400 members. By 
September 1989, perhaps as a result of the need to discuss the events of Tiananmen 
Square, the readership increased to over 4000. By 1998，the Chinese News Digest 
website hit 4 million hits per week with an estimated 180,000 users reading the digest^. 
Founded and run by members of the Chinese News Digest, the Chinese Community 
Forum boasts a similar history and at its peak in the mid-90，s had over 4000 subscribers 
» 
4 From the Sina.com website: http://ads.sina.com.hk/ 
5 From the Chinese News Digest website: http://www.cnd.org/CNDhistory.html 
42 
to its weekly email digest, which was published in English. However, by 2001 this 
decreased to under a thousand and by 2003 the Chinese Community Forum has ceased 
weekly publication and exists only as an archive^. Nevertheless, both the Chinese 
News Digest and Chinese Community Forum echo the Qiangguo Luntan in its 
recognition by scholars of the Chinese Internet with numerous publications regarding 
Chinese civil society and the Chinese diaspora documenting their central roles in the 
beginnings of the Chinese presence on the Internet. 
Less venerable, but nonetheless recognised in the academic literature for its role in 
uncovering atrocities committed against Chinese Indonesians in 1998^ and for rallying 
thousands of Chinese in a dozen countries to protest and publicise the incident to 
newspapers and governments around the world, the World Huaren Federation (WHF) 
has been hosting both a web-based bulletin board and private email list. However, 
although WHF instituted a web-based bulletin board, by 2001，this bulletin board was 
rarely used. Accordingly, this study focussed upon samples taken during the author's 
participation in the private email lists, which were hosted both on groups.yahoo, com 
under the group 'huarenlist' and on a variety of emails accounts run on hunchnet.com, 
which together formed the crux of the online discussion at WHF. In contrast with the 
young student and young professional user populations found in the Mainland and 
Hong Kong forums and the intellectual user base of the Chinese News Digest, WHF 
users were much more diverse with many residing in the West but coming from South 
6 Information regarding the Chinese Community Forum gained from the author's first-hand involvement 
as a volunteer editor from 1998 to 2001. 
7 See Tay's (1998) account ofWHF's involvement in the uncovering of anti-Chinese atrocities during the 
Indonesian riots of 1998. 
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East Asian (Malaysian, Singaporean and Indonesian) backgrounds although some 
participants were first generation migrants from Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese. 
Ages ranged from early 20's to late 70’s with the majority ranging from 35 to 50 years 
old and professions ranged from student to professional to businessmen and capitalists. 
As with most other online forums of this nature, the large majority of participants were 
male. 
As the architectures of the above sites were diverse, a number of sampling 
methodologies were used. For those sites that permitted the viewing and searching of 
messages by date, an evenly spaced sample of approximately 400 messages was taken 
from those dated between September 12^ 2001 and October 11出，2001. All the 
messages were sampled if the total number of messages was less than 400. For the two 
Hong Kong sites, which did not allow for date-based searching, sampling of these sites 
was done by searching for all topics related to September All messages dated 
between September 2001 and October 11 2001 were sampled. 
Results 
Discursive analysis of the national frames used to interpret the September attacks 
in the six sample sites revealed a number of findings, which are summarised in Figure 2. 
The findings for each site can be summarised under three subheadings:-
1. Overall Frame: describes the overarching ideological frame used to interpret the 
September 11出 attacks in that site. 
2. Interpretations: Lists the various types of interpretations used in that site which 
combine to make up the overall frame. 
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3. Ideological Beneficiary: elaborates the political faction / class most likely to benefit 
or be supported by these interpretations 
Mainland China Hong Kong West 
Overall Frame: Anti-Imperialism Economic Liberalism Orientalism 
Interpretations: 1. "Just another tragedy" 1. Economic Shock 1. Righteous crusade 
2. "terrorism=separatism" 2. International against Islamic (and 
.2 3. US government is a weak humanitarian complicit Confucian) 
"S custodian. tragedy civilisation and their 
芝 tyrannical 
governments 
S — —— — — — — 
Western mainstream 
Ideological . „ Hong Kong capitalist society as against Chinese 
Beneficiary: Chinese Harty-btate elite / government elites and other cultural 
minorities. 
Main Frame: Global Populist Chinese Transnationalism 
Interpretations: 1. Pro-US: Global tragedy / 1. Pro-US: Global 1. Moum loss of life few/ 
mourn loss of life Tragedy / mourn non-American deaths 
2. Anti-US: Result of bad loss of life due to US aggression 
Karma - revenge for US 2. Anti-US: Result of equal in importance, 
imperialism / bad Karma - fruits 2. Result of bad 
.1 expansionism of US aggression Ka rma- f ru i t s of US 
c 3. Superiority of aggression 
O Chinese culture 3. Failure of 
and civilisation non-Chinese 
civilisation and 
spiritual values 
Ideological Chinese Nationalist Subaltern 
Beneficiary: 
Figure 2. Summary of Results 
As summarised in Figure 2，each mass media site surveyed employed ideological 
frames that supported the ruling elite. Hence, the mass media sites tend to agree with 
Lee et al's (2002) finding that mass media interpretations of global news events 
continue to run along national boundaries and this finding supports the liberal-pluralist 
assumptions that nationalist frames in the mass media are the rooted in the domination 
of states. However, this finding did not extend itself to nationalist frames used on the 
Internet. Instead, interpretations of September by Chinese on the Internet were 
surprisingly uniform across all three sites and hence, transcended national boundaries 
and the hegemonic range of states. Moreover, the ideological frames used to interpret 
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September 1 i n all three online sites had ambivalent relationships to the ruling elites 
and often had counter-hegemonic elements. Instead of supporting the ruling class, the 
primary ideological frame was supportive of a global Chinese subaltern harbouring 
feelings of populist pan-Chinese solidarity and cultural superiority. Such findings 
indicate that while liberal-pluralist assumptions may often be valid for the workings of 
mass mediated nationalism, they are inadequate for understanding the nature of online 
nationalism, whose proponents are often non-state groups who are not necessarily 
restricted to a localised geography. The following is a further elaboration of the 
findings found in each site. 
Mediated Discourse in Mainland China: supporting the Party-State 
As expected, the Chinese state's hand in social and cultural institutions in the dominant 
media discourses of Chineseness and Chinese nationality was highly obvious and this 
was reflected in my examination of media interpretations of the September 11 attacks in 
the Mainland press. Reporting of the September attacks reflected the dominant 
discourse of nation proposed by the communist party elite and were largely in line with 
classic themes that emphasise China's equal place among a family of nations in 
opposition to a Western-led post-imperial hierarchy, usually expressed in the oblique 
Chinese press in terms of multipolarity and anti-imperialism as well as justifications of 
Chinese government's authoritarian policies such as the suppression of separatism. 
Together, these themes portray the Chinese Communist Party as the rightful 
representative of the Chinese nation, as well as a protecting paternal figure to which 
Chinese citizens should be loyal and this has the effect of conflating the state with the 
nation. 
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Using a mixture of silences, de-emphasis and neutral reporting that lacked political 
commentary, Chinese reports denied the global importance given to the event by the 
international media and seemed to portray September 11th as "just another tragedy", 
equal in significance, perhaps, to a quickly forgotten flood in India or a neglected war in 
Central Africa. This interpretation of the attacks can be construed from several 
phenomena. Firstly, a search for related articles indicated showed scant coverage of the 
event (414 articles total; 40 relevant articles involving September 11th or equivalent in 
the title) making up only one third the number of articles found in the same period in 
Hong Kong. Moreover, articles are often repeated in several papers and the 
entertainment related articles are sourced either from Western or Hong Kong 
newspapers and carried by second-tier regional newspapers^. More compellingly, the 
event appeared to be downplayed by the official government papers such as the Beijing 
Youth News to such an extent that it was promptly picked up by the Washington Post^ 
which lambasted the Chinese press for "relegating the attacks to the inside pages" and 
for "playing the story among other international reports." (This vitriolic article was 
later attacked and rebutted in the People's Daily which countered the claims made by 
8 An example of how entertainment news is sourced from places such as Hong Kong and used in 
Mainland news can be seen in this article:"爲911死難者簿款獻血成龍，救人不分種族” China 
News Service [Entertainment News] September 24''' , 2001 which was carried in the Hong Kong 
newspaper The Sun the day before: “爲 9 1 1死難者籌款成龍身體力行一拖八多倫多捐血成龍： 
救 人 無 分 ！ The Sun [Local Entertainment] September 23", 2001. 
9 “The state-run press gave the disasters in New York and Washington prominent front-page play for 
only one day. By today, Beijing Youth News, the most popular newspaper in the capital, relegated the 
story to inside pages and focused its reports on the concern expressed by Chinese leaders for Chinese 
citizens who may have been killed in the attacks. The People's Daily, the Communist Party organ, played 
the story today among other international reports." ("In China, Anti-U.S. Sentiment Unfettered" 
Washington Post, September 14, 2001 pA26) 
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the Washington Post and strongly criticised the irresponsibility of the American press 
and the general ignorance of the American public towards China' 
Although the event could not be completely ignored, the majority of reports consisted 
of bland neutral reporting of the attacks and the ensuing effects, if any, on national 
economic growth ‘ ‘. This de-sensationalisation of the event sought to downplay 
America's privileged position in the global news order and also sought to position 
China's place in a global community of equals. The impression that it was the position 
of the state-controlled press to redefine the equality of importance between China and 
the United States, is reinforced by what little political reporting that did exist. 
In terms of such political reporting of the attacks, the Chinese media remained 
conservatively careful with the result being that papers either made no explicit political 
statement or, as was the case of official government mouthpieces such as the People's 
Daily, stuck to the official party line quoting the statements of top party officials. In 
such articles, political meetings were blandly reported and peppered with short quotes 
from top leaders such as Li Peng and Jiang Zemin and this ensured that the only 
political positions expressed by the Mainland press were those directly spoken by the 
1° "FM Spokesman Refutes Washington Times' Slander on Chinese Media: Foreign Ministry spokesman 
Zhu Bangzao Tuesday said that the Washington Times and some other American media are extremely 
irresponsible in saying that Chinese state media have issued stories in support of terrorism. Chinese 
government opposes any form of terrorism. Some non-governmental publications related to the attacks 
came out in China after 911 Incident— all containing strong objections to terrorists." ("Some American 
media extremely irresponsible" Peoples Daily English Online Edition November 14th, 2001) 
”Examples of economic news included titles such as: 
“計算機世界網-“911”事件後IT業的損失爲158億美元” Computer World, September 18^ 2001; 
and “911 事件使美國經濟面臨困境"China Securities News, October 1 2 0 0 1 
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party elite. Such reports primarily carried a number of key statements about the 
September attacks. Firstly, was the statement made by the Chinese Deputy 
Representative to the United Nations Shen Guofang who states that "the September 11 
terrorist attack on the United States has nothing in common with human civilization, 
and the fight launched by the international community against terrorism, is not a 
conflict among different races, religions or cultures but a fight between justice and evil, 
civilization and barbarism." ^ ^ To this effect, China has been adamant about its 
agreement and support of the US and Western interpretation of the attacks and Shen 
Guofang, Premier Li Peng as well as Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan have on numerous 
occasions expressed their opposition to terrorism to this effect^ 
12 China Stresses UN's Role in Promoting Dialogue Among Civilizations People's Daily 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20011 l/09/eng20011109_84202.shtml 
13 Examples of statements of support for the United States' position against terrorism can be see in the 
following excerpts: 
"On the issue of anti-terrorism, Li reaffirmed China's position, saying China strongly condemns the 
September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, and has been consistently opposed to all 
forms of terrorism and acts of violence no matter when, where' and by whom they are committed or at 
whom they are targeted." ("China Determined to Develop Ties With Latin America: Li Peng" Peoples 
Daily http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20011 l/13/eng20011113_84483.shtml) 
J ‘ 
"In his speech delivered at the general debate of the 56th General Assembly Sunday, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Tang Jiaxuan pointed out that terrorism is a tiny fringe of extreme evil, representing neither any 
ethnic group nor any religion." ("Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan on Anti-terrorism, Taiwan and Other 
Issues" Peoples Daily, November 14, 2001) 
“The Chinese government, he said, has all along condemned and opposed terrorism in all its forms and 
steadfastly supported international cooperation against terrorism. "We believe that since the fight against 
terrorism is for the protection of human rights, the means taken should meet this end," he [Shen Guofang] 
added." (China Puts Forth Proposal on Promotion, Protection of Human Rights Peoples Daily November 
1 5山’ 2 0 0 1 ) 
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However, while these quotes further played into China's performance as a responsible, 
respected and hence worthy member of the international state order, naturally opposed 
to the forces of chaos and global instability, China's support of the US position does not 
constitute China's agreement with the US narrative of global leadership and Western 
values. Instead, this support for the United States' interpretation contained a subtext 
which at best can be seen as China's insistence on its equality with the United States 
and at worst, can be seen as the condemnation of US hegemony. The notion of China 
being an equal and important member of the international community can be seen in a 
variety of statements by leaders quoted in the People's Daily which emphasised the role 
of the United Nations, "equality in international affairs"'"^, solving problems within a 
"multilateral framework"^Furthermore, leaders are quoted as making statements that 
14 “Shen made a three-point proposal on bringing into play the role of the United Nations in promoting 
dialogue among civilizations. It includes: First, in the political dimension, the U.N. should conduct the 
dialogue among civilizations so as to remove the negative impact of the Cold-War mentality on 
international relations, promote the principle of democracy and equality in international affairs and push 
forward the establishment of a just and equitable new international political order. 
Shen stressed there are no superior or inferior civilizations in this world. He said the peaceful coexistence 
and common development of different civilizations can only be achieved through their learning and 
benefiting from each other on the basis of equality and mutual respect." (China Stresses UN's Role in 
Promoting Dialogue Among Civilizations People's Daily 
http://english-peopledailv.com.cn/20011 l/09/eng20Ql 1109 84202.shtml) 
15 "As the September 11 terror attacks showed that terrorism was the common threat of the international 
community, Sha said, pointed out that one of the most effective ways to combat it is to work within the 
multilateral framework and conclude through negotiations a reasonable, feasible and effective protocol 
on the basis of the existing mandate." (People's Daily "China Expounds Position on Biological Weapons 
Convention" "http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20011 l/20/eng20011120_84906.shtml 
November 20th, 2001) 
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are plainly critical of United States' power politics with Shen Guofang stating that the 
United Nations played a critical role in "the removal of the cold war mentality" ^ ^ and Li 
Peng noting candidly that "there are still various forms of hegemony and power politics, 
and unequal, unjust international relations of the strong bullying the weak, the rich 
bullying the poor and the big coercing the small, instead of being eliminated, have 
taken on new development."'^ Interpreted within this official subtext of resentment 
against US hegemony in politics, trade and culture, the relegation of the September 11 
attacks into the inside pages of official newspapers as reported by the Washington post 
would appear to be a denial of the United States' centrality in world news and an 
attempt at evening out the inequality between the United States and other countries, 
including China. 
This theme of emphasising China's rightful place in the world's political hierarchy 
plays into the even more pertinent narrative of justifying the Chinese Communist 
Party's leadership of the nation and the emphasis on Chinese equality with the United 
States paints the communist party as the defender of China's prestige and interests in 
the global political arena, and hence plays to the country's populist nationalist concern 
about being suppressed by Western countries, which as we will see, is a dominant motif 
in the populist online Chinese nationalism. 
16 China Stresses UN's Role in Promoting Dialogue Among Civilizations People's Daily 
http://english.peopledailv.com.cn/20011 l/09/eng20011109 84202.shtml 
17 ("China Determined to Develop Ties With Latin America: Li Peng" Peoples Daily 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20011 l/13/eng20011113_84483.shtml) 
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However, while the Chinese state and the press play on such populist sentiment, it does 
so only to justify its credentials as rightful heir to the Chinese nation. Through 
rhetorically hijacking the nation by assuming the role of defender of national prestige, 
the Chinese state elite are able to redefine populist Chinese nationalism away from its 
ethnic loyalty to cultural values and towards loyalty to the Chinese state and its policies. 
This instrumentalist twist can be seen in how a number of articles tie in the events of 
September with images of US incompetence and justifications of controversial 
Chinese policies. These articles range in subtlety from the blatant attempts by Foreign 
Minster Tang Jiaxuan and Peoples Daily writers to label the Eastern Turkestan / East 
Tujue independence movements as terrorist organisations^^ in order to justify Chinese 
state policies in these regions to more subtle articles that rely on analyses of the events 
related to September In an article appearing in a telecommunications industry 
newspaper, the author criticised developments in American telecommunications 
infrastructure and law noting that the United States made a grave mistake by 
concentrating its telecommunications backbone within a single area, which suffered 
extensive damage from the attacks. In addition, the article claimed that because the 
United States is overly concerned with matters of privacy, it was too slow in 
18 "'China is also threatened by terrorism," he said. "The 'Eastern Turkestan' terrorist forces are trained, 
equipped and financed by international terrorist organizations. The fight against the 'Eastern Turkestan' 
group is an important aspect of the international fight against terrorism.'" ("Foreign Minister Tang 
Jiaxuan on Anti-terrorism, Taiwan and Other Issues" November 14th, 2000 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20011 l/12/eng20011112_84374.shtml) 
and also: "Unveiling the Terrorist Nature of 'East Tujue' Elements" (Peoples Daily, November 16th, 
2001) which recounts in detail a number of murders and bombings in the Xinjiang region thought to be 
related to the East Turkestan independence movement and to the Islamic groups that are thought to fund 
them. 
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strengthening its ability to protect the country against criminal acts such as September 
1 ith and the article calls for the Chinese government to speed up legislation to prevent 
similar acts from occurring in China^^. 
Such articles imply a failure of the US government to protect its citizens and justify the 
increased control of the Chinese state upon the nation, conflate the interests of the state 
and the nation and imply a paternalistic relationship between them, summoning the 
traditional Chinese trope of the father-and-son relationship. Hence, while America's 
failure to protect its citizens from disaster was seen as the failing of the state's 
responsibility as a good father, the Chinese state's authoritarian repression could be in 
turn, be interpreted as the strict but well intentioned custodianship of a responsible 
father, for which, the Chinese citizen should repay with filial loyalty. 
In this way, by implying not only that the Chinese state is not only the representative of 
Chinese national interest and prestige but that the good Chinese citizen should be 
loyally supportive of the state's control of the nation lest a disaster befall China as it did 
the United States, the conflation between Chinese state and nation becomes complete — 
convincing us that the Communist Party is the nation and the true nationalist is one who 







步伐’防患於未然。”（‘旁觀者的反思——美國“911事件”留下三大問題’ Peoples Wire Post 
[News] September 19", 2001) 
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Mediated Discourse in Hong Kong: supporting the values of the capitalist elite 
In contrast to the singly dominant influence of the party-state on the Mainland 
discourse of Chineseness which permeates interpretations of the September 1 l^ h attacks, 
Hong Kong rejects Chineseness and Chinese nationalism as a frame for interpreting the 
September 1 i s s u e . Rather, Hong Kong's press chose to interpret the September 1 
attacks through the dominant ideology of Hong Kong's ruling capitalist elite, whose 
primary concern is for economic liberalism and political stability. 
The overriding concern of Hong Kong's mass media with matters economic, the 
primary ideological component in Hong Kong's capitalist ideology, is evident in the 
proportion of articles that mention September in an economic context and this is 
reflected in the sample collected which found that over 42% of articles dealt with the 
economic implications of September 1 T h e s e included the impact of the attacks on 
certain sectors of the global economy but the primary focus was to the regional 
economy and also to individual companies of local interest^®. Such forecasts, while 
mostly negative were occasionally positive with a few articles predicting 'good news' 
such as the accelerated economic growth of the Chinese Mainland due to increased 
9 1 
capital inflows diverted from the United States . 
The following titles are indicators of the general economic theme present in Hong Kong's 
economisation of September 11"' and show reporting ranging from wide reporting of certain sectors of 
the economy to those dealing with specific shares: 
“ � 9 1 1 � 雪 上 加 霜 ASM 跑輸大市“(Apple Daily [Shares and Investment] September 19出，2001) 
“匯豐 � 9 1 1 事件」損失難估計”（Hong Kong Economic Times [Investment] September 20�“，2001) 
“911事件加上百合跪風島内旅遊市場面臨萎縮”（Hong Kong Commercial Daily [Taiwan News] 
September, 1 7 � 2 0 0 1 ) 
21 While the above articles are mostly negative, not all articles were pessimistic about the economy and 
the following article talks about the potential positive consequences of September for foreign 
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However, economics did not make up the entire discourse. In terms of political news, 
reporting dealt mainly with the local/regional political consequences for Greater China 
and analyses argued for changes to Sino-US ties believing that relations would improve 
n 
and related to this was the effect on Sino-US policies with regard to Taiwan . Another 
article believed that September presented political opportunities for the Chinese 
Government�� . Moreover, in two cases, September was hyper-localised by local 
writer and political commentator Chen Ye (陳也）who in both instances used 
September to criticise the perceived incompetence of the post-handover Hong 
Kong government, which is seen to be the handmaiden of the Chinese Communist 
Party. In two sensationalist commentaries entitled "When Hong Kong faces its own 
September 1”卜’，and "Imagine Hong Kong's September 11出，’,Chen Ye imagines and 
laments about how Hong Kong would have compared to New York if it was faced with 
its own September 11 出.In Chen's articles, both the Hong Kong government as well as 
investment in China: “911 加速外資投華”（Apple Daily) [China Finance] September 28% 2001. The 
same positive note on China was echoed by the pro-Chinese newspaper Ta Kung Pao which believed that 
Guangdong trade growth would be unaffected: ”廣交會發帖增12%料911事件不會對與會客商人數 
有大影響 "T a Kung Pao [China Economy] September 28''', 2001 
22 The following titles are suggestive of the political commentary on September 1 
"911 改寫兩國關係布殊：中國不是敵人” (Sing Pao [Headlines: 2001 APEC Summit] A02 October 20, 
2001) 
“立法院明起開會審法案立委將質詢911事件對兩岸影響 (Hong Kong Commercial Daily [Taiwan 
News] September 2001) 
23 "911 有利北京增長國際勢力” (Apple Daily [Cross-Straits News] AOS October 4 � 2 0 0 1 ) 
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local culture is ridiculed^"^. Evocative historical phrases related to China's promise to 
Hong Kong and its aspired international status such as "50 years no change" and 
"International Metropolis of Asia" are made fun of and those aspects of contemporary 
Hong Kong perceived negatively, such as foot massage, negative assets and the keeping 
of concubines in China. 
The sensationalism of Chen Ye's articles is not unique and it is complemented by the 
strong element of entertainment news and Hong Kong's sensationalist tendencies 
localized, personalized and trivialised September 1 l^ h through relating the event to the 





是熏黑了的半邊天的•^撒厘襟瓶..…燴！，、( “當香港遇上911仇家” (Apple Daily [Celebrity 












診 911 香港版” Apple Daily [Celebrity Opinion] E14 September 19出,2001) 
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personal trauma of local stars played a prominent part of the secondary reporting of 
September and reports of Jackie Chan^^, viewed in Hong Kong as a role model due 
to his international success, giving blood intended for victims and being in mourning 
for a week was complemented with the 'traumatic' experiences of lesser pop and sports 
stars such as Ng Man Yan (吳文忻）whose father worked in New York and of Ma Sit 
Chi (馬薛正)，who sympathised with his friends and alumni in the US and Pun Ho Yin 
(潘浩賢）who worried about his mother in New York but who remains determined to 
study in the US^^ 
25 These three excerpts illustrate the trivialization of the September 11th attacks. In each of these 
excerpts, Jackie Chan is quoted as being an active participant in the international tragedy, acting as a 
compassionate and humanitarian role model for Hong Kong people: 
“事件發生之後，成龍震驚之餘心情沉重’由於沒心機開工加上情緒低落，成龍停工數天直到昨 
日才復工’在酒店之內’成龍更是數度落淚哭泣° ” (“成龍原定911世貿廣場開拍《鼻涕蟲》” 
Oriental Daily [Entertainment] C06 September 18th, 2001) 





是，由於英國剛有瘋牛症’而女主角則體重太輕’紅十字會不肯接納° ”（ “成龍捐血援助911 
傷患” Ming Pao [Film and TV] September 23rd，2001) 
“爲911死難者籌款成龍身體力行一拖八多倫多捐血-成龍：救人無分種族！ “ (The Sun [Local 
Entertainment] September 23rd, 2001) 
26 These three excerpts illustrate the depth of trivialisation that was found in the Hong Kong media and 
the emphasised portion in the following excerpt notes "Especially, God bless Natalie's father is alright 
and also thank God for protecting Easy Finder for publishing our revised edition without any problems": 
" 9月1 1日當晚’除了紐約世貿被襲外；亦是吳文忻（N a t a l i e )考慮會否爲《便利》革號拍一 
突破性封面既回覆日“當晚10時左右致電Natalie，正擔心身處紐約父親安危既Natalie從電話筒 
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However, while the trivialising nature of the political and entertainment news seems at 
first to say little about Hong Kong's interpretation of the event, such trivialised and 
personalised stories in fact play a powerful part by interpreting September 11th not only 
as an economic issue, but also as a humanitarian crisis in which Hong Kong people, led 
by local celebrities such as Jackie Chan, should play a part in relieving. 
However, the sympathy shown to the victims of the September 11th attacks should not 
be interpreted as a statement of support for the United States and its foreign policy and 
this became apparent in strong anti-war sentiment against the United States later on in 
its wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, the sympathy shown by the Hong Kong 





image做我既selling point ’接受唔到既人咪唔好蹄囉，少一個人支持我都無所謂啦°呢一刻’我 
生活開心，身邊所有人都健康快樂就已經心滿意足了。」T吳文忻911啓示錄” Easy Finder (壹 
本便利）[EasyGirl] September 19th, 2001) 
“薛正倫Df日係中環行街遇見記者’佢近排甚少出席公開場合’原來佢去左旅行，重係美國911 
發生前，係美國返黎。…倫話：「真係好彩’遲點至去都可能撞到正，我係係美國讀書既’有 
唔少朋友重係那邊’好彩個個都平安有事°」“(“馬薛正倫911前返港歎好彩” Apple Daily 
[Entertainment]] CI8 September 20th, 2001) 




班。」”(“無懼�911�慘劇潘浩賢明年赴美升學”Apple Daily [Sport] AA6 October 2nd, 2001) 
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media to the victims of September 11th should be seen as a general condemnation of 
violence and other political instability, which is ultimately bad for business. 
Hence, both the overriding economic framing of September 11th, complemented by a 
humanitarian plea for political stability fits well within the ideological schema of both 
local capitalists and government elites who serve to benefit much from endorsing 
liberal economics and political conservatism. 
Mediated Discourse in the West: reinforcing the Orientalist establishment 
An analysis of those discourses that did mentioned China or Chinese in relation to 
September 1 t e n d e d to paint China according to Orientalist and authoritarian frames 
familiar in the Western literature on China. 
While the vast majority of articles mentioning September and China were 
concerned with reporting of Jiang Zemin's verbal support of Bush's anti-terrorism 
stance, as well as their meeting at the APEC summit held in Shanghai in the following 
month which departed from economic issues and discussed issues of terrorism, the 
subtext was clear and a number of stories explicitly captured the Western scepticism 
about China and warned (albeit correctly) that Chinese support was an excuse to justify 
suppression of Muslim and Tibetan minorities at home and one story believed that 
"Orwellian China would just as clearly like the world to view Tibet through the lens of 
the Bush doctrine":?. Other articles believed that China was reluctantly forced to go 
along with the US after finding its supposed allies in Central Asia were supporting the 
27 "A Double Standard in War on Terrorism?" The Boston Globe, October 24, 2001 p7 
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u s and one specifically expressed incredulity about the new cooperation between the 
US and China and reiterated China's proper role as an enemy, quoting Samuel 
Huntington's thesis that the West would be threatened by a future "Islamic-Confucian 
Amance，’28. 
Some articles departed from the happenings of political elites and addressed popular 
Chinese sentiment and one widely circulated article from the Washington Post 
lambasted the anti-US sentiment on Chinese forums, blaming the propaganda of the 
Chinese state for creating Chinese sentiment but reiterated that most of the silent 
majority did support the US^^. Other articles echoed the criticism of the Chinese 
government, but did not deny the popular dimensions of Chinese national identity. 
Instead, they claimed that Chinese people are so used to lies that they don't believe 
Western truth^°. 
The authoritarian frame used in these articles when talking about China is well known 
and popularly held. It imagines the Chinese government as an evilly suppressive and 
manipulative regime and Chinese people as naively unsophisticated; either easily 
manipulated by the government's nationalist propaganda or silently supportive of the 
US, but passively docile to oppression by evil anti-American elites. 
28 “China: New Ally or Old Foe" Christian Science Monitory, October 26，2001 p9 
"In China, Anti-U.S. Sentiment Unfettered" Washington Post, September 14, 2001 pA26 
30 “After September 11: The Chinese are so used to being lied to by their media that they don't trust ours. 
You can't altogether blame them" The Guardian (London), October 23, p5 
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Global Online Discourse 
An analysis of online discussions about the September 11th terrorist attacks in forums 
serving the three respective Chinese communities based in Mainland China, Hong 
Kong and the West allows a comparison of discourses found in the mass media. 
However, while the three mass media sites represented distinct interpretive themes that 
supported the ideology of the ruling elite, a review of online discourses in the same sites 
found that the underlying themes used to interpret September 11th were extraordinarily 
similar. The following sections recount the main lines of interpretations found in each 
of the three online sites. 
Mainland China 
The Internet was heavily utilised by Chinese netizens for interpreting the events of 
September 1 a n d over 10,000 messages were posted in the first week alone for the 
popular Qiangguo Luntan. University sites such as Beijing University's Weiming BBS 
("No-name BBS") and commercial sites such as Netease were also popular. 
As expected the range of interpretations found online was somewhat more diverse than 
the univocality of mediated discourse and interpretations were divided between what 
could be interpreted as pro-American and anti-American discourses. However, this 
anticipated diversity was complicated by a puzzling find which showed that the heavily 
censored Qiangguo Luntan, which consisted of a rough balance of opinion, showed 
more diversity than the relatively unrestricted Netease, which was almost completely 
anti-American. 
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In the two forums surveyed, pro-American messages were largely concerned with 
sympathy towards the victims of the attacks and argued that the attacks are an attack on 
innocent civilians, humanity, modem society or American liberal v a l u e s � � O t h e r 
pro-US participants were concerned with criticising the anti-American participants for 
allegedly gloating over the death of innocent civilians and accusing them as "not 
human" and "an example of China's disgrace". 
In all such messages, September ll^h was framed such that the event was 
decontextualised from the history of US-Arab relations and viewed purely as a 
senseless and evil attack on innocent lives, civilisation, humanity and liberal values, 
running largely in line with the US mass media's interpretation of the events and giving 
testament to the powerful hold the United States has on global narratives. 
''Messages titled “爲美國人民’爲人類’爲自由與和平，默哀““(Qiangguo Luntan，September 12， 
2001) represented the general theme of the pro-US line, showing the tendency of these posts to see the 
attacks as an offence against humanity and American liberal values. 
32 This excerpt is representative of pro-US accusations against the anti-US camp: 
“看到美國世貿大樓被炸’我除了感到震驚沒有別的想法，恐怖分子的行徑是對人類尊嚴的挑戰 
和發瀆’它讓我們每個人感受到生活在莲藍可危之中° 







木的中國人笑看美國的悲劇，麻木的人們，你還能說你是人嗎？ ？ ？ ？“ 
我爲那些麻木的中國人感到羞恥！ ！ ！ Netease, September 12, 2001 emphasis added) 
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However, on the other hand, the majority of posts could be described as anti-American. 
Such posts ranged in length and rationality and posts ranging from historical and 
political analyses spanning several pages to phrase-long outburst�� and name-calling^'^. 
Anti-American contributions took diverse lines of reasoning. Some posts argued that 
the American deaths deserved no sympathy just as the American-caused deaths of 
Chinese journalists in Yugoslavia and the fighter pilot Wang Wei garnered no 
sympathy from the American people^^. In fact, perceived acts of US aggression were 
often mentioned and these included support for Taiwanese independence, suppression 
of Vietnamese and Palestinian civilians and sanctions against Iraq in addition to the 
recent NATO bombings of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia and the spy plan 
incident. Others believed that although the innocent loss of life was to be sympathised 
with, ultimate culpability was with the American government rather than with the 
33 The emotionally-charged nature of some posts was apparent with one post specifically stating that they 
wouldn't feel better without first teaching pro-American (Chinese) "lackeys" a lesson: “不行！這裏美 
國人的奴才太多！不教育他們不解氣” R e :希望大家冷靜下來探討問題！ Qiangguo Luntan, 
September 14’ 2001). 
34 Name-calling was commonplace and some accused pro-American contributors as "American pigs"[美 
國 豬 ] { R e : 爲 所 有 遇 難 華 人 和 無 辜 美 國 平 民 默 哀 S e p t e m b e r 12’ 2001) and "Democracy 
activist dogs" UM是幾隻民運狗，註冊無數個ip. NetEase, September 12, 2001) 
3 5
“美國發生的事應該是他自己咎由自取！你在爲美國打抱不平的時候有沒有想過伊拉克人民的 
生命，有沒有想到過越南人民的生命！有沒有想到過巴勒斯坦人民的生命！ ！ ！美國爲了追求自 




中文而羞！ ！ \” 我唾棄這些奴顏婢膝的小人! ！ ！ ！ ！ “ Qiangguo Luntan, September 14,2001) 
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terrorists. Still others hoped that the unfortunate tragedy would wake the American 
elite from its hawkishness and one post expressed sympathy for "humanity, freedom 
and peace, but not the American people"^^. 
Rhetorically diverse as they may be, the anti-American posts were backed by a 
common nationalist framing of September 1 T h i s framing saw the attacks within the 
context of US and Western civilisation's aggression against Chinese, Arab and other 
civilisations and sees Chinese culture as peace-loving, wise and prudent and generally 
superior to Western civilisation's rash barbarian nature. This rather traditional Chinese 
worldview made itself explicit in the phraseology of quite a few messages. One 
politically neutral participant, who asked that discussion be rational, requested that 
participants should seek zhongyong (中庸)，meaning neutrality or orthodoxy, a 
highly-held Confucian value]?. Another poster replied that it was all very well for 
Chinese to be calm and contemplative, but it would be difficult to expect from 
Americans and another argued that September 1 w o u l d never happen in China as 
38 
Chinese have never suppressed smaller countries and have never obstructed peace . 
3 6爲人類’爲自由與和平’默哀。但是不爲美國人“Qicingguo Luntan, September 12, 2001 
3 7
“評論時請保持客觀理智’謝謝合作°對’在激情和理智間尋求中庸” {Re:fm ：評論時請保持 
客觀理 Netease, September 12’ 2001) 
38 Excerpts such as these two: “老劉呀，中國人總愛冷靜地思考問題，美國人是不是也這樣？ ” (Re： 
注意萧辟靜深持客MNetease, September 12，2001) and “中國沒有欺凌過弱小的國家，中國 
沒有阻撓過世界的和平…” ijie:如果發生在中國(轉載)Netease, September 14，2001) serve to 
demonstrate how China is seen by nationalists as being peaceful and hence different from American and 
western civilisation. 
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The use traditional Chinese symbolism and phraseology also suggested a traditional 
Chinese worldview. One post arguing that September was a punishment just 
deserved quoted "Says the Buddhist School: What goes around comes around"(“佛家 
有云：因果報應”39). 
However, this Chinese nationalist sentiment in no way directly served to benefit the 
ruling regime and instead, respondents were quick to mock and criticise the CCP and 
Netease's state-sanctioned censors for their efforts to censor radical online nationalist 
sentiment, seeing their actions as “a rare chance for [NASDAQ listed] Netease to 
impress the Americans lest Greenspan suspend Netease's licence’，恥 and the conduct of 
a weak government who will lose the support of the Chinese people for not standing up 
to American imperialism'^\ 
39 R e :我爲那些麻木中國人感到羞恥！ ！ ！ TV彻aye, September 12，2001 
4。“網易好不容易找了個機會來討好美國人’不刪掉我們的帖子’格林斯潘一火’網易就要永遠 
停牌了”（Re:斑竹的態度 Netease, September 14, 2001) 
‘‘“ ！ ！中宣部還特別針對「第四媒體」互聯網的報導指出’近日互聯網的開放論壇出現極爲錯 
誤的趨勢，管理失控，出現大量爲襲美恐怖事件歌功頌德的言論’同情恐怖分子’對美國遇襲幸 
災樂禍’起了很壞的影響，並被海外某些反華輿論所利用，要求各主管部門必須馬上糾正’加強 
監管，嚴格把關。！ ！是啊！中宣部說的真對啊！ ！ ！如果被美國大人們看到的話’美國大人們 
要生氣的啊！！我們是跟在美國屁股後面的！怎麼可以說美國的壞話呢！！！我們使館被炸！ 
王偉被殺！！都是沒關係的！！是美國人一個巴掌打過來我們自己沒躲開呀！！！！美國人來 
打我們時 我們要傷心’美國人被別人打時 我們也要傷心！ ！我們還是一個國 
家嗎？ ？ ？我們還是中華人民共和國嗎？ ？我們還是東方的巨龍嗎？ ？我們不是美國的一個殖 
民地吧？ ？ ？？？所謂言論自由呢？ ？ ？ ？我們懦弱的政府！ ！ ！這是懦弱的表現！ ！！這 
是失民心的做法！ ！ ！失民心者失天下！！！ ！！！ ！！”（我們懦弱的政府！！！！！！！！ 
Netease, September 14，2001) 
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Hong Kong 
In Hong Kong, where the culture of avoiding politics usually shuts out political 
discussion at an interpersonal level, commercial web-based forums such as Sina, 
Yahoo and Uzone21 became sites for debate among the young and Internet literate 
(Sing Tao Daily, September 21, 2001 A44 and September 25, A36). 
Hong Kong's forums were totally unregulated, unlike their mainland counterparts who 
make somewhat ineffective attempts at censorship, but this lack of censorship did little 
to change the dominance of nationalistic frames and interpretations were similarly 
critical of US interpretations. 
The character of the discourses found in Sina's Hong Kong forums echoed that found in 
the mainland and pro-Chinese nationalist frames dominated over pro-US or more 
bipartisan views. Nonetheless, the use of the nationalist frame was not universal and in 
the case ofUzone21, Christian youth neither justified Arab attacks on the United States 
or the planned revenge attacks on Afghanistan. As intended by Breakthrough, the 
forum operators, the dominant interpretations of September came from a Christian 
rather than a nationalistic worldview. Nevertheless, the forum was not completely free 
of Chinese nationalistic interpretations'^^. 
42 Threads such as "God and War"[神 Vs 單戈爭]which debated how Christians should see the ensuing 
war between the US and the Arab world were representative of the general Christian flavour of 
Uzone2rs discourse. However, though the Christian overtone was strong, the distrust of US foreign 
policy were reminiscent of Chinese nationalist frames and some posts criticised the US as being 
"dangerous" and acting as "the world's police." 
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The Chinese nationalist frame was much more pronounced on Sina's Hong Kong site 
where, like the mainland forums, were populated by a pro-American minority and an 
anti-American majority. 
The discursive elements in both the pro-American and Chinese nationalist elements 
mirrored that found in the mainland. Pro-American posts argued that since any attack 
on civilians is evil, then the perpetrators of the September attacks must also be evil. 
By calling themselves names such as "World Citizen"(地球人)，proponents believed 
themselves to be representing the voice of a universal civil society. Netizens that 
believed otherwise or were felt to be sympathising with the Arab world were labelled 
"cold hearted", "horrible" and "gloaters"(幸災樂禍 
Like those posted on Mainland Chinese websites, Anti-American views ranged from 
crude and emotive cursing of the United States"^ "^  to well-reasoned, negotiated positions. 
Overall, these messages revealed a nationalist theme quite similar to that found on 
mainland forums. These messages viewed the events from a distinctly Chinese subject 
position, and the themes of imperialism and clash of Chinese and American 
civilisations echoed the views found in the mainland. Differences between the 
nationalist discourses in Hong Kong and the Mainland existed only in the occasional 
Examples of such labelling and name-calling: "This is really sorry for what you felt, you are not more 
less than the horrible guy." (Re:美風活薪Sina.com，September 12，2001); “.•.人非草木，唔明的人 
點解可以幸災樂禍.” (Re:爲所有死傷的美國人感到深切慰問同婉惜.Sina.com, Sept 12，2001); 
"Milner, flick you!冷血的你” {Re: Sina.com, September 12, 2001). 
44 Single lined messages entitled “美國低死” and “美國該活”（Sina.com, September 11,2001) are 
representative of the emotiveness of some participants. 
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use of Hong Kong popular culture and anti-Tung rhetoric 45. However, these 
differences were minor and the existence of local Hong Kong culture, politics and 
humour is perhaps less interesting compared to the fact that there were so many 
commonalities between Hong Kong and Mainland ideological packages. 
Like their mainland counterparts, Hong Kong critics of the US raised the issues of 
NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, the suppression of Yugoslavs 
and Arabs as well as US involvement in anti-Chinese separatist movements in Xinjiang, 
Taiwan as proof of the US's imperialism and hence, indirect culpability in the 
September 1 a t t a c k s . In addition, Hong Kong participants, who often have relatives 
living in the West and who may be more knowledgeable about the West than their 
mainland counterparts, argued against the US claim that it represents freedom and 
human rights by pointing out US mistreatment of American Indians, Blacks and 
overseas Chinese*�. 
45 Hong Kong posts were often coloured with Hong Kong culture and local concerns. One participant 
called for terrorists to bomb Tung Chee Hwa “炸美國’不如炸董建華！！ ！！” {Sina.com, September 
12’ 2001) to which another jokingly warned that "they might accidentally bomb Bank of China." 
(Sina.com. September 12, 2001). Another poster wrote a criticism of American foreign policy by 






人，一般的炸，有何善惡之分？ ” [布殊屠龍記.Sina.com, September 18，2001) 
46 Examples of posts discussing American aggression include: “中東，南斯拉夫人民生命不寶貴卩馬？ 
對美國只能以暴易暴’某些美國平民嘴臉也?……“（Sina.cpm，September 12，2001); 
“唔同意’疆獨藏獨台獨通通是西方國家搞鬼’所以要教訓美國！ ”（Sina.com, September 12， 
2001); 
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This denigration of the United States as an aggressive imperialist power lies in contrast 
to the participants' portrayal of China and Chinese. Participants believed that Chinese 
are righteous, tolerant, honest and do not mistreat minorities and that the superiority of 
Chinese wisdom has allowed it to survive for 5000 years^?. One writer explicitly stated 
that "I also have always believed that the Chinese are world's most superior race’，48. 
Other participants argued for Chinese superiority from a military view, citing that the 
“美國是世界最大恐怖主義國家！使用原子彈打日本，用導彈襲擊中國使館！ “ (Sina.com, 
September 12，2001). 
Examples of criticisms of US record on human rights / race relations: 
"Re:美國人先係恐怖分子’殘忍的歷史有殺紅番’殺黑人’殺越共！ ”（Sina.com，September 14， 
2001) and the following excerpt: “黑人往往被壓在社會的最底層，受最差的教育，只可以做最差的 
工作.但與之相以，中國人的待遇可能更差，由於中國人人數少，因此所有大城市都把中國人的需 
要放在最後:事實上，差不多所有北美的大城市中，唐人街往往是城中最破爛的，只有溫哥華與仕 
加堡例外” { M S S i n a . c o m , September 18, 2001) 




國表態支持美國，否則就代表支持恐怖份子，簡直辔不？ Sina.com, September 21, 2001) 
“中國人能存在世上五千年不是沒有道理的，不是白混的。美國建國至今才兩百二十五年’中 
國歷史上多的是兩百多年就滅亡了的朝代啊！“（我地繼續爲被美國害過既死傷者’表示深切槪 
慰問’但無需沈默！ Sina.com，September 17，2001) 
4 8
 “我也一樣一直認爲中國華人是世上最優等的民族”（Re:美國越來越似法西斯德國Sinaxom^ 
September 16’ 2001). 
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Chinese has defeated the United States in both the Vietnam and Korean wars"^ .^ Finally, 
t 
the feeling of racial/cultural superiority can be seen in the nationalist monikers adopted 
by some participants - and these included "Hero of the [Chinese] Race"(民族英雄尸 
and "Real Chinese"(真的中國人 
This Chinese nationalism, like that found in the Mainland, bases its pride upon the 
perceived superiority of traditional Chinese culture rather than upon the beliefs of the 
modem socialist state and in addition to messages advocating Chinese cultural 
superiority, the use of traditional ideological resources, particularly the Buddhist notion 
of karma, appeared frequently in messages claiming that the attacks were the 
consequence of US aggression. Various renditions of popular idioms "Plant Melons, 
Get Melons"(種瓜得瓜尸 and “Good is repaid with good and evil with evil"(善有善 
幸艮，惡有惡幸艮)53，which were also seen on mainland forums and overseas Chinese 
forums (see next section), were frequently used. 
Further supporting the notion that Hong Kong's online forums was dominated by a 
traditional populist Chinese nationalism rather than a nationalism that supports China's 
socialist state, is the appearance of messages that are highly critical of the Chinese (and 
4 9
 “第一次在韓戰，因爲中國支援北韓,搞到美國要求和談;第二次在越戰，又係中國支援北越，搞到 
美軍要坐直昇機逃亡離開越南.”〈但歷史上美軍輸過俾中國兩次Sina.com, September 25，2001) 
美國低死 Sina.com, September 11，2001. 
5
1人性的本能是受壓迫就反抗’而反抗是不擇手段的’美國對外戰爭有顧及平民生"SZnfl.com， 
September 12, 2001. 
5 2不分巷白支持美國的港人應否反省？古語有云：種瓜得瓜Sina.com’ September 16，2001. 
53善有善報’惡有惡報 ’ dust to dust，earth to earth ’ amen. Sina.com, September 12，2001. 
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Hong Kong) government. These messages criticised the perceived "pro-US" stance 
adopted by the Chinese government, especially while as noted by the author, when "the 
Chinese people are gloating over the attacks.”54 The Hong Kong media, which also 
took a vaguely pro-US line was also criticised by netizens claiming that Hong Kong's 
mass media is a mouthpiece for America^^. 
. ； ‘ 
The Chinese Diaspora 
In overseas sites, while the established and well-documented sites such as the China 
News Digest (華夏文摘)and Chinese Community Forum were somewhat active, the 
less documented but highly politically active set of widely cross-posted email lists that 
make up World Huaren Federation was alive with activity. 
The affective nature of many postings on bulletin boards in Hong Kong and the 
Mainland was somewhat rarer in the diasporic forums which contained lengthy and 
reasoned postings. This well-reasoned quality was especially obvious in the 
email-mediated discussions of the diasporic World Huaren Federation as well as the 
weekly digest formats of the overseas-based Chinese News Digest and Chinese 
Community Forum. 
However, the main theme of interpretation used was no different from that found in 
online forums in Mainland China and in Hong Kong. In fact, writings from the Chinese 
怪現像，中國官方傳媒同情美國[真心？] ’人民普遍幸災樂禍Sina.com’ September 14, 2001; 
5 5香港許多傳媒是美國傳聲筒’甚至美國控制’制造輿論誤導市民’反華親美！ Sim-com, 
September 12, 2001 
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diaspora were even more pronounced and even writings sympathetic to the victims of 
the attacks were footnoted with sympathy for Yugoslavian and Arab victims of US 
foreign policy as well as critical analysis of the motives of US policy and Islamic 
terrorism. This anti-American discourse reflected the populist nature of the Chinese 
nationalism to interpret September 1 
Like that found in Hong Kong and Mainland China this anti-American discourse was 
divided into an extremist portion that essentialised America and did not separate US 
foreign policy with, the victims of the bombing and those that offered a more negotiated 
position - differentiating between the loss of innocents and the injustices of US policy. 
The extremist portion focused on the humiliations of Western slights of the near and 
distant past. These messages viewed the disaster as a much-delayed consequence of 
bad karma sewed during the West's past imperial aggression and present-day political 
meddling. Recent disputes with China, such as the 1999 bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Yugoslavia and America's continued support for Taiwan figured 
prominently among the list of Western crimes along with the deaths of countless 
Yugoslavians and Arabs that were the victims of American foreign policy. But perhaps 
the most popular line of argument involved the opinion that the Chinese fighter pilot 
Wang Wei, who died in a collision with an American spy-plane, was avenged by the 
death of Americans^^. 
56 “As we ponder the fate of Afghanistan in the face of massive land, sea and aerial strikes from the 
American imperialists and aggressors in their maddening search for an amok-running criminal called bin 
Laden, let our thoughts wonder back to the day when the conspicuious [sic] Chinese embassy in 
Yugoslovakia [sic] was strucked [sic] by the American missiles when on another day and at another 
location in the brilliance of the South China Sea and on the peaceful and coconut swaying palms of 
Hainan Island, the space above it brought down some 24 American aerial spies together with their 
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While the extremist discourse crossed the line of taboo by being insensitive over 
American casualties, the negotiated view avoids this by de-essentialising or avoiding 
completely the deaths of both Americans victims of the bombing and victims of 
American foreign policy. Online participants who employed this strategy occupied a 
humanitarian, anti-war stance and held US government elites such as Dick Cheney, 
institutional incompetence and Machiavellian politics accountable for the plight of 
these innocent civilians with the overriding theme consisting of sympathy for the 
victims and a call for foreign policy reform^^. 
much-hated spy plane and death of the Chinese hero and defensive pilot, Wang Wei, who now cries for 
these Chinese heroes who perished in the embassy and above the very soil of China? 
Now because some buildings were bombed by some unknown terrorists and death of many in America 
the whole world mourns as if it has lost its many father, mothers, husbands and wives. But who mourn for 
those innocent Chinese heroes due to American expansionism and imperialism? This is like putting the 
cart before the horse. All these cries and beating of the chests are just so much crocodile tears. 
Trouble-makers always get away "scot-free," [sic] the victims and their loved ones remain to suffer and 
to grieve. 
We, the righteous Chinese, who have been subjected to foreign invasions and foreign aggressions, we the 
rightful descendants of these foreign powers' bullying and looting, we call upon the Chinese Communist 
Part, its organs and the Chinese leadership to stop kowtowing to American imperialism and 
expansionism and stand up for all the oppressed people throughout the world, including those oppressed 
in the Middle East. Paying lip services are making a mockery of what is righteous, moral percepts and 
virtues. 
Don't be weak-kneed, standup to the world bully and tell them to go to hell.…Kowtowing is a sign of 
cowardism [sic] and weakness. Need we say more of weak-kneed Chinese Leadership????? ~ Huang, 
Liang, He, Chen, and others [Beijing]" Chinese Community Forum, September 19, 2001 , Issue 2001035 
57 An illustrative example of such an interpretation of the event can be seen in the following email: "I am 
still trying to make sure all but my friends in New York are fine. But, I hate to say it: Americans invited 
it. Somebody had said in Radio that this is an event waiting to happen. In retrospect it indeed is. They 
kept messing up with those crazy people and drive them even more crazy." Impact of WTC bombing on 
American Policy? Huarenlist September 12, 2001. 
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However, rather than grounding itself upon a universal humanitarianism as was the 
case in Hong Kong and Mainland China, this relatively sophisticated nationalist 
discourse resonated with notions of Chinese cultural superiority in which the values of 
the humanitarianism were bound to the Confucian/Taoist values of social harmony and 
the traditional Chinese motifs widely used betrayed the popular cultural nationalist 
frame of interpretation rather than the national identity of the Chinese party-state. In 
their criticisms of US foreign policy, classical philosophers^^ such as Meng Zi, Sun Zi 
and Lao Zi were widely quoted in both English and Chinese and the proverb "Plant 
melons, get melons; plant beans, get beans" ^^  became a popular phrase. 
However, the most conspicuous signs of a Chinese cultural civilization being the 
primary interpretive frame was manifested in several posts that explicitly mentioned 
the notion of a Huntington'esque Clash of Civilisations. One author specifically 
interpreted terrorism as an attack on modem Western civilisation^^ and another author 
believed that the current problems of terrorism is the result of modernity's 
destabilization of the culturally unestablished and historically weak West which 
‘達到“與天下共利”（孟子語）’我們才能夠走上最終和平的道路’有感“九.一一"ChinaNews 
Digest, September 21，2001，Issue 547 
59 English translation of original Chinese (種瓜得瓜’種豆得豆）from an email entitled Reap the 
Whirlwind HmrQnlist, September 27，2001 
“明裏暗裏同情恐怖分子的人也愛將恐怖活動的原因歸結爲美國中東政策的失誤’我說，這是 
看到了現象而沒有看到本質。恐怖主義真正仇視的是西方現代文明。” from解析恐怖主義China 
News Digest, September 28, 2001, Issue 548 (emphasis added) 
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destabilised Arab civilization, which like Chinese civilization was powerful and stable. 
This author also argued that the tropes of righteousness, freedom and democracy are 
not useful for understanding the events of September and instead, the West's 
relative lack of civilisation is seen as the fundamental problem^\ Other postings 
explicitly stated the belief in the superiority of Chinese cultural values and advocated 
that China evangelise its peaceful humanitarian values to "Christian and Islamic 
Civilization" in order to save the world^^. 
Also of note is the online Chinese reaction to the Washington Post's lambasting of 
Chinese gloating over the attacks ^ ^ and although a number of posts echoed the 
^'From 有感“九.——“China News Digest, September 21,2001, Issue 547 
62 The following two messages are highly illustrative of China's emerging 'evangelical' narrative: 
(1) "In either case, a door is now opened for China to step in, being neither white nor black but yellow 
and neither Christian nor Islamic but humanist Confucian. If Beijing leaders are wise enough to know 
how to manipulate this black hole, who knows the 21st and even the 22nd centuries won't be China's -
without having to shed a drop of blood? It may now be up to China and its poeple [sic] to save the 
world!" A black hole. Huarenlist, September 18，2001. 
(2) “China should move boldly into the new millennium with the best of its own heritage, and the best of 
the world's civilization, by promoting this moral truth among all nations and religions. China is called 
"Zhong Guo" which is translated by those who understand "Zhong" only in its geometrical sense, as the 
"Middle" Kingdom, but for more than two millennia, "Zhong" derives its richest connotation from being 
associated with one of the four classics of Confucius, the "Zhong Yung" (Doctrine of the Mean), which 
defines "Zhong" as being unbiased, and "Yung" as being in perennial equilibrium (not static ossification). 
The modem renaissance [sic] of China is inseparable from its own moral awakening, that China, or 
"Zhong Guo,"is the nation based on "Zhong Yong." In Chinese, "Zhong Guo, Zhong Young Zi [sic] Guo 
Ye,"" Zhong Guo, Zhong YongZi Guo Ye Chinese Community Forum, October 17,2001. Issue 2001038 
63 “In China, Anti-U.S. Sentiment Unfettered" Washington Post, September 14，2001 pA26 
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Washington Post's outrage at their compatriots, one post mentioned that irrational US 
nationalism online has also frequently been just as sadistic as the Chinese variety^" .^ Yet 
another response justified Chinese national identity and this quote is significant in its 
explicit reference to the cultural and economic basis of the brand of national identity 
that I have found to be pervasive in Chinese online political discourse: 
"I believe Chinese national identity is fundamentally healthy. It is not 
based on hate, it is based on pride. Pride due to 5000 years of 
civilization and recent economic success. Chinese national identity is 
also a rebelian [sic] against the self-demonization of liberal Chinese 
intellectuals and the cultural control of the West." 
Re: Washington Post: In China, Anti-U.S. Sentiment Unfettered 
Huarenlist September 16, 2001 (emphasis added). 
However, like their counterparts in Hong Kong and Mainland China, overseas Chinese 
nationalists have very little positive to say about the ruling Chinese state and one 
particular online post that included a number of such sentiments strongly criticized the 
Chinese government for being weak for not resisting the United State and as such, is in 
contrast to the Western view that Chinese nationalism is necessarily supportive of the 
party-state^^. 
64 "There has been some shocked talk in some Western journals about the unpleasant behaviour of some 
youths in internet chatrooms in China . •. Indeed, many of these fora seem to act as repositories for the 
ravings of the mentally ill of all nationalities. For example, after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
May 1999,1 was disturbed by the number of gleeful responses to the attack from Westerners on 
soc.culture.china (SCC) to the attack; many of the said writers used rather sick "noms de guerre" (as they 
would no doubt like to think of them). I remember several expressing disappointment that the death toll 
hadn't been higher. In addition there were the usual "Let's nuke Beijing now!" type." Chinese Community 
Forum, September 19，2001，Issue 2001035 
76 
Analysis 
The postings that ran against the dominant US interpretation in all three online sites 
exhibited a number of important similarities. Firstly, they resisted the ideological 
frames given to them by the dominant mass media of their locality. Secondly, they used 
the same symbols, events, metaphors and narratives to interpret September 
Finally, although all three online sites exhibited a strongly nationalist tone, this 
nationalism did not translate into direct support for the Chinese state regime. Instead, 
both the state and the national media regimes were strongly criticised for resisting the 
popular view. 
Popu l i s t Greater Chinese Nationalism 
Not merely the simple virtual reflection of the state's nation building efforts, online 
discourse of Chinese nation seem to be different from that of state-dominated offline 
discourses and the discourse analysis suggests that the online discourses of Chinese 
nation is not that which is promoted by the modern Chinese state nor that promoted in 
Hong Kong or by Western countries. Rather, the narratives and motifs used to interpret 
September reveal a populist or ethnic fundamentalist national identity that 
imagines China as a once powerful civilisation, morally and culturally superior from 
other 'barbarian' races and although humiliated in modem times, will hopefully recover 
its former glory. 
This populist worldview sees China as the centre of world civilisation where to be 
civilised is defined as holding to Confucian values such as harmony and tolerance and 
the worldview faults Western military incursions and political interventions of the last 
two centuries as the reason for China's current material poverty and views both the 
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West and Islam as warlike and barbaric. Framed within this discourse, the West-Arab 
conflict that is exemplified by September 11th confirms the insatiable ambition and 
intolerant nature that was the root of the West's continual incursions into Chinese 
territory since the 18th century. 
Populist Greater Chinese national identity is based upon notions of ethnicity and 
common culture which differs from and at times even opposes the national identity 
sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party. While state-sponsored national identity 
views the formaticn of a multiethnic People's Republic as the culmination of 5000 
years of Chinese history and lives up to simple Marxist notions of ideology in which 
national identity is seen as existing to prop up the regime, popular Chinese national 
identity is not restricted to the geographical limits of the PRC. Inclusion into this 
imagined community is ethnic rather than legal. 
Furthermore, this popular Greater Chinese nationalism has an ambivalent relationship 
with a number of state and nation-state institutions and while the mediated discourses 
of the Mainland's 'State-as-Nation, Hong Kong's notion of Chineseness as trope for 
class and the West's Orientalist discourses of China represent elite discourses backed 
by visible and tangible political institutions, the populist discourse lacks significant 
support from any elite institutions. In fact, in this study, I find that online posts were 
deleted by Chinese censors in Mainland China and the lack of enthusiasm towards this 
global discourse of Chineseness by powerful state institutions has been documented in 
Uhalley's (1994) account of the history of Greater China. Indeed, while this potentially 
subversive discourse was rejected by Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese governments, 
even the then Singapore President, Lee Kuan Yew the proponent of Asian Values and 
Confucian values, was reluctant to lend support to the institutionalisation of Greater 
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China65. The same antagonistic relationship between institutional elites and online 
Chinese nationalism is certainly true in the West, where the phenomenon was picked up 
by the influential Washington Post and lambasted. However, while the dominant 
scholarly and popular wisdom as expressed by the Washington Post argues that this 
online nationalism is instigated by the Chinese state, our analysis of Mainland China's 
mass media discourses seems to support another conclusion — that the nationalism of 
the Chinese state is an attempt by the state to tame an already powerful populist 
sentiment. As discussed in the review of mass media discourses in Mainland China, the 
official nationalism justifies the current regime's rule by positioning itself as the 
defender of the Chinese nation against the oppression of the imperialist West - that is, it 
relies in a central narrative element found in popular Chinese nationalism. Hence, 
rather than an instigator of the online Chinese nationalism, the evidence suggests that it 
is the Chinese state that struggles to position itself within a more powerful populist 
sentiment that it has never been able to fully control. 
Finally, while the national boundaries dictated by the mediated discourses are more or 
less territorial, the online discourse of Chineseness is based upon traditional boundaries 
of ethnicity and common culture rather than territory. This nation, founded upon the 
foundations of a Han/Confucian civilisation, often finds itself at odds with the state's 
brand of nation, which for reasons of state interest defines the nation as a multiethnic 
People's Republic within a well-defined territory. Furthermore, while the territorial 
nature of the mass mediated versions of the nation has allowed these narratives to reject 
65 "Senior Minister Lee, for one, has warned of the dangers of ethnic divisions in South-east Asia being 
exacerbated if economic solidarity among overseas Chinese should be perceived as having political 
overtones. They need to guard against fostering the concept of a 'greater China'". (Business Times 
(Singapore) December 6，1993) 
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indigenous ideology for foreign communism or capitalism, pro-Confucian nationalists 
are ambivalent about the ideology of the current regime and some proponents envisage 
a new regime based upon the traditional values of pre-modem China (albeit with 
contemporary modifications) that could provide for a future Chinese renaissance. 
Hence, this online discourse is ambivalent about the territorial claims put forward by 
the mass media discourse and threatens to challenge the stated territorial borders of 
their ideologies. While the mediated discourses justify and are in turn supported by 
territorially bound institutions with well-defined jurisdictions, the populist discourse 
found online transcends administrative borders and advocates membership in a 
transnational global Chinese community. 
Hence, findings indicate that the online discourse of Chineseness 1. is often critical or 
even hostile to the Chinese party-state and also challenges the definitions of citizenship 
and territorial integrity of other states - and accordingly lacks the support of state 
institutions; 2. differs from established mass media discourses of Chineseness in all 
three geographical sites; and 3. not only advocates a transnational solidarity based on 
ethnicity, but is itself also globally spread, with adherents living all around the globe. 
This strongly suggests that the phenomenon of online Chinese nationalism is a force 
that works outside of the state's control rather than, as is assumed by the 
liberal-pluralist model, at its behest. 
Civic and Capitalist 
The evidence presented so far in the above section regarding the relationship between 
online Chinese nationalism and the state seems to challenge the top-down, statist 
notions of nationalism adopted by the liberal-pluralist model. A secondary finding 
lends further, albeit minor, supporting evidence against the liberal-pluralist model by 
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suggesting that the phenomenon of online Chinese nationalism also challenges the 
modernist binaries that inform liberal-pluralist views about the incompatibility of 
nationalist and liberal values and implying instead that discourse of ethnic locality that 
we have seen is a discursive mix of old and new, 'modem' and ’pre-modem’. 
In contrast to liberal-pluralist predictions, the online discourse of Chinese nation places 
a strong emphasis on liberal values, and particularly capitalist values, which are central 
to the notion of 'Greater China'. Postings such as "Capital investment soars in 
quarter，，66 and "The Importance of Overseas Chinese by Dr. Shao You-Bao"^^ which 
describes the work of Dr Shao from Ohio University who talks about the importance of 
the Chinese Diaspora in the Chinese economy, are commonly found in online forums 
and function both as an encouraging sign of capitalist economic development in China 
as well as a source of Greater Chinese ethnic pride. Hence while the traditional 
Chinese worldview, like its century German counterpart, saw commerce as a filthy 
and ignoble enterprise, modem inflections of Greater Chinese ethnic identity turns this 
upside down. To the Chinese nationalists of cyberspace, Chinese success in business 
has turned into a source of pride. The academic discourse of a Greater Chinese 
capitalism, which argues Greater China's phenomenal growth rates is based upon 
Confucian culture, not only serves to boost national pride by showing that Cultural 
China can beat the West at its own game, but when repackaged and sold under Lee 
66 "Capital Investment Soars in Quarter" (IS^ *" April 2003, posted by bala at Chinese News Digest. 
Original report from Xinhua News Agency) 
67 "The Importance of Overseas Chinese by Dr. Shao You-Bao" (12th October, 2001，posted by Joe Tan 
at Huarenlist. Original report from http://www.librarv.ohiou.edu/subiects/shao/main.htm) 
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Kuan Yew's banner of Asian Values, also justifies its political conservatism on the 
basis of the economic benefits of social stability. 
In terms of liberal political values, while support for authoritarian government is not 
entirely non-existent in the Greater Chinese discourse (and this is rooted perhaps in the 
discourse of 'Asian Values'), political authoritarianism does not have a monopoly and a 
number of online participants, despite being highly critical of US foreign policy and 
being 'pro-Chinese', consciously subscribe to political liberalism. 
Furthermore, and most interestingly, both political and economic liberalism is 
indigenized as a Chinese invention by reference to the Taoist scholar Lao Zi's edict of 
"govern by doing nothing"^^ 一 a phrase which resonates with the Western concepts of 
economic and political liberalism that advocate the notion of a weak government and 
the evils of state intervention. Through such traditional canonized resources, 
participants are able to reconcile the apparent support for 'western' liberal values with a 
Greater Chinese naitional identity that emphasizes China's cultural superiority. 
Such findings suggest that nationalism cannot be seen simply as either modem or 
anti-modem. Instead, national identities are themselves constantly hybridized and 
reconstructed to cope with new ideological struggles and social realities and indeed 
their very existence relies in their ability to appropriate and subvert established webs of 
meaning. This hybridity is however, not only seen in online discourses and while the 
Chinese communist expressed in the mass media nation once waged bloody war against 
68 "China 's own libertarian visionary, and champion of laissez-faire, the ancient sage Laozi, had it 
right all along. Wu wei er zhi (無爲而治、Govern by doing nothing” from huarenlist September 30，2001 
"Re: RE: Reaping the Whirlwind" {original Chinese term added) 
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reactionary traditional values, it now appropriates the traditional trope of the 
authoritarian father and filial son in order to justify its policies. 
The Inadequacy of the Liberal-Pluralist Framework 
The results from this study suggests then that online Chinese nationalist discourse is a 
global discourse of Chineseness that differs from the territorially-bounded discourses 
of Chineseness dominant in the mass media environments that were surveyed. 
Furthermore, this online discourse not only conflicts ideologically with the discourses 
of Chineseness found in the mass media of the surveyed countries, but it is also ignored, 
rejected and partially censored by a number of state institutions. Together, this 
suggests that online Chinese nationalism has an ambivalent or adversarial relationship 
with state and nation-state institutions not only in the People's Republic of China, but 
also in other countries, suggesting that online Chinese nationalism does not represent 
the extension of state hegemony - Chinese or otherwise. Secondary evidence, which 
suggests that online discourses of Chinese nationalism have hybridized, indigenised 
and advocated liberal political and economic values rather than oppose such values lend 
further evidence against the validity of the liberal-pluralist model in explaining online 
Chinese nationalism. 
Together, these findings support my critique in the previous chapter of the 
liberal-pluralist assumptions that nationalism is invariably the result of state hegemony 
and that nationalism is necessarily antithetical to liberal values. Hence, these findings 
lend evidence to the idea that the relationship between the Internet, nationalism and 
civil society is more flexible than is assumed by the liberal-pluralist model. 
Consequently, this study provides evidence against the prevailing claim that the 
Internet will lead to the demise of nations and nationalism. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Internet and Mass Media Nationalism 
As our analysis of mass media narratives suggest, the dominant institutionalised 
discourses of identity remain powerful and even in a global era, discourse remains 
bound by the laws of power and hegemony and our results correspond to Lee et al's 
(2002) finding that even in a globalised mass media, national media continue to 
interpret global events according to their own elite discourses of nation. However, our 
analyses of narratives of Chineseness on the Internet indicate that the mass media's 
inviolable rules of nation-state hegemony may be relaxed somewhat on the Internet and 
in this study we find that while the Internet is not the rational nation-free public sphere 
that it was predicted to be, neither does the Internet simply reproduce the hegemony a 
la the mass media. Rather, we find that online nationalist discourses are different from 
their mass media counterparts and this departure from prevailing predictions suggests 
the inadequacy of the liberal-pluralist model, which argues that nationalism is 
state-instigated and that the rise of the Internet will lead to the end of nationalism. 
While it is possible that these findings are affected by my choice of the September 11出 
attacks rather than some other global event important to Chinese such as NATO's 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia or confrontation with Japanese 
warships at Diaoyutai, anecdotal accounts of such events also point to the existence of a 
populist Chinese nationalism that not only differs from the Chinese state's official line, 
but sees the Chinese state as being weak, corrupt and incapable of defending the rights 
of its citizens against perceived American, British or Japanese aggressors. During these 
global events, populist sentiment was always clearly more radical than the Chinese 
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official line, which was mostly concerned with maintaining peaceful relationships with 
the concerned countries as well as ensuring the stability of the populace. 
Moreover, the validity of this study can be further verified from the work of other 
scholars of online nationalism seem to corroborate well with the results of this study, 
forming a consistent and robust pattern that illustrates the dynamic between the Internet 
and nationalism, which was not predicted by the liberal-pluralist model and which 
suggests that online nationalist discourses are: 1. populist, usually subaltern, 
movements constructed within civil society rather than state-instigated; and 2. defines 
citizenship in transnational and ethnic terms rather than ideological or territorial terms. 
Fung and Kedl's (2001) work on online forums is a case in point about the ambivalence 
of online nationalisms with state institutions and their study shows that while the 
national frame exists, the nationalism adopted by netizens are not necessarily 
supportive of their respective state-institutions. This is echoed by a variety of studies of 
online nationalisms as diverse as India, Colombia and diasporic groups such as the 
Kurdish, Armenian and the Macedonian nations, which are not only examples of the 
populist, non-state nature of online nationalisms but which are also illustrative of the 
transnational and ethnic nature of citizenship that is characteristic of online national 
discourses. For example, Sundaram，s (2000) study of online India nationalism finds 
that online Indian nationalism consists of a mix of subaltern and diasporic nationalisms 
based upon a Hindu rather than the official modernist nationalism advocated by the 
Indian state. Similarly, Duque's (2001) and Bakker's (2000) respective studies of 
Colombian and Armenian, Kurdish and Macedonian websites, speaks to the potential 
of the Internet in resisting the powerful national discourses of the state and for 
imagining alternative, transnational ethnic communities. 
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Such findings point to a weakening power of state-institutions and a strengthening of 
civil society but also to a transformation (rather than the demise) of the dominant form 
of nationalism from the territorially bound, state-instigated, ideological nation to a 
transnational, populist, ethnic nation. The explanation for this development may be 
related to the Internet's ability to free cultural expression from the restraints of state and 
capital. 
Structuralism: freedom from state and capital 
This study's finding that there were consistent differences between the nationalist 
discourses of the mass media, which are of the traditional state-led type, and the 
nationalist discourses of the Internet, which are populist and ethnic, suggests that 
structuralist factors are not completely irrelevant. Indeed, structuralist explanations 
would argue that the dominance of populist rather than state nationalism on the Internet 
owes to the Internet's ability to decentralise - that is, to allow expression to groups and 
individuals with little or no access to political or economic power. 
In terms of the mass media, Chinese Mainland political control of the press is common 
knowledge and is widely acknowledged. On the other hand, while the mass media in 
Hong Kong and the West is not controlled explicitly by the political establishment, the 
mass media there does have a number of business and economic constraints and for 
reasons of credibility, law and advertising and sales revenue, the 'free' press is careful 
not to offend the sensibilities of its readers, advertisers, political elites and other 
influential stakeholders. Furthermore, the mass media by economic nature involves 
high capital costs and high costs of production and is hence unable to accommodate a 
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diversity of voices. This failure to accommodate diversity is especially pertinent in the 
West, which is home to a large number of ethnic minority groups. 
In comparison, the minute costs involved in production and distribution of information 
on the Internet through online forums means that the expression of opinions is 
relatively decoupled from larger business and economic considerations, making it a 
space amenable for the flourishing of non-institutionalised ideas. Hence, in this respect， 
structuralist frameworks such as liberal-pluralist political economy have been quite 
successful at predicting and explaining the positive relationship between the Internet 
and the decentralisation and pluralisation of ideology. 
Culturalism: a site for creating and sharing meaning 
However, while structuralist theories are able to explain the Internet's ability to 
decentralise ideological power away from state and other institutions, such theories 
have been less successful at understanding the workings of this decentralised 
ideological landscape. In contrast to the predictions of liberal-pluralist predictions, the 
freedom of the Internet results not in a rational public sphere but rather, in a 
freewheeling cyberspace home to all manner of 'irrational' ethnic divisions and 
nationalisms. 
Instead, the culturalist view of ideology, which sees modernist communicative 
rationality as a form of ideological control and communication as a process of political 
empowerment, offers a more promising avenue for explaining this decentralised 
landscape. 
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With regard to the relationship between substantive freedom of speech and 
communicative rationality, a number of writers (e.g. Fung and Kedl, 2001) have 
suggested that a decentralised power structure lends itself to the expression of emotion 
and identity politics rather than rational debate. That is, the Internet's anonymity and 
lack of real sanctions means that it lacks the marginalizing and normalising practices 
that enforce rational debate. This anonymity is often criticised for being the cause of the 
low quality (in rational terms) of arguments because the speaker is not held responsible 
for their own words. On the other hand, this lack of control is able to protect the speaker 
from social retribution for articulating socially unacceptable (which includes 
“irrational，，) ideas.. With regards to our current study of online narratives of 
Chineseness, views ranging from the politically radical to the downright sadistic were 
expressed online, openly and without fear, even though it would have been be socially 
controversial to challenge established hegemonic interpretations in 'real life'. Thus, 
the Internet turns out to be too free to be rational or in the language of 
post-structuralism, the Internet frees us from the panoptic gaze of modernist rationality. 
Free from the control of both state-led nationalisms and modernist institutions of 
rationality, the Internet becomes a site for groups and individuals to engage in identity 
politics — gathering online to construct and share politically empowering interpretations 
of global and local events and narratives about the origin and values of the group. It 
provides a place where people can share their self-empowering subaltern narratives 
with a wider community of peers and exchange ideological resources for the 
construction of their identities. The Internet, then, is a forum for alternative, subaltern 
discourses of identity that may challenge the hegemony of elite discourses and offer 
different interpretations of global events. Moreover, the Internet is not simply a refuge 
for these non-institutionalised narratives. It is also a platform on which to rally 
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participants around such narratives and interpretations in order to conduct organised 
political acts. 
Such a process of constructing, sharing and acting on narratives of self-empowerment 
seems to describe quiet faithfully the phenomenon of online Chinese nationalism found 
in this study which discovered Chinese netizens frequenting these online forums and 
negotiating a populist national identity more politically empowering to the average 
Chinese netizen than that the subordinating discourses of Chineseness dominant in the 
mass media, which seek to create subjects subservient to the party-state or the 
continued dominance of the Western, white imperialist discourses in Hong Kong and 
the West. 
Moreover, throughout the study, the author witnessed the ideological empowerment of 
Greater Chinese nationalism translate into physical political action when one of the 
forums, World Huaren Federation, became the launch site for rallying of support 
against the repression of overseas Chinese. World Huaren Federation is illustrative of 
the Internet's potential for identity politics and in 1998，led by unofficial leader Joe Tan 
living in New Zealand, participants spread around the world protesting simultaneously 
in reaction to anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia, and attracting the attention a number of 
states and the popular press (Tay，1998). While at the time of writing, WHF is fraught 
by internal fighting between 'global citizens' and 'Chinese nationalists'^^, it may still 
rise to become the umbrella organisation for Chinese political and cultural institutions 
around the world that it is working to become. If and when this happens, the Internet 
69 Information gained from the author's participant observation in WHF and through telephone and email 
interviews with Joe Tan and other core members. 
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will have been the birthplace upon which a populist pan-Chinese nationalism is 
constructed, disseminated and materialised. 
Limitations and Future Work 
This study has a number of limitations, which may be the subject of future work. 
Firstly, this study finds the existence of a globally homogenous, online discourse of 
Chineseness that is based upon specific narratives and metaphors. However, no attempt 
is made here to uncover the discourse producing institutions that lie behind such a 
global and surprisingly homogenous national identity. Future studies might aim to 
conduct an archaeology (Foucault, 1972 [1969]) of this discourse in order to uncover 
the institutions and powers responsible for constructing and disseminating this Greater 
Chinese subjectivity. 
Secondly, this study does not investigate why these particular netizens chose to adopt 
and help to construct and online narrative of Greater China rather than just simply adopt 
the dominant narratives of Chineseness in their respective communities. One plausible 
explanation may be the empowering nature of the Greater Chinese discourse in relation 
to other established discourses and while the dominant discourses of Chineseness in the 
three communities surveyed are deeply embedded with codes of subjugation - whether 
that be subjugation to white, Western superiority as is the case in dominant codes of 
Chineseness in Hong Kong and the English speaking Diaspora or to political and 
ideological deference to the communist party elite. For the highly educated Internet 
users who differentiate themselves from the dominant majority by possessing a 
passionate concern for political matters, enough to voluntarily participate in online 
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political forums, it might be that discursive subjugation may be less readily accepted 
than it is by the dominant majority, leading these politically conscious individuals to 
actively construct an alternative Chineseness using various potent resistance motifs of 
cultural superiority and economic ascendance. Future studies may employ 
ethnographic studies in order to examine more closely, this process of identity 
construction. 
Conclusion 
The existing liberal-pluralist narrative has been inadequate in explaining the 
phenomenon of online Chinese nationalism and in this study, I have sought to 
deconstruct and uncover the underlying problem behind this dominant model. By 
testing the underlying assumptions of this prevailing liberal-pluralist model - that 
online nationalist discourse is instigated by and supportive of the state, and that 
nationalist discourse is necessarily antithetical to civic values, this study provides 
evidence that challenges both of these assumptions and by extension, challenges the 
liberal-pluralist prediction that the Internet will lead to the end of nations and 
nationalism. 
Instead, evidence suggests that online nationalism is different from the national 
discourses found in the mass media, which do seem to operate according to 
liberal-pluralist understandings of the relationship between state, media and nati onalist 
discourse. In contrast to mass media nationalisms, which run along the ideological 
lines of the state, online nationalism has an ambivalent relationship with the state, 
defines citizenship transnationally in terms of ethnicity rather than ideologically or 
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territorially, and is a hybridised discourse that readily advocates liberal values widely 
thought to be hostile to nationalism. 
Furthermore, such nationalisms are constructed not in the state, but within the realm of 
global civil society. This global civil society defies the liberal individualist rationality 
predicted by modernist theories, and instead allows the expression of empowering 
narratives of identity. In this regard, the Internet becomes not the public sphere as 
described by Habermas, but rather, to the horror of scholars and political commentators 
who fear the hatred and irrationality of populist nationalism, a vehicle for political 
self-empowerment through identity politics. 
Finally, as theories that see the nation as being invariably tied to the state are being 
banished to their rightful obsolescence and as the Internet becomes the cradle on which 
these empowering nationalisms become articulated, constructed and organised on a 
global scale, in the future, the nation may decouple somewhat from the state and take a 
path of its own. As the state increasingly weakens and geopolitics becomss 
increasingly swayed by the 'irrationality' of global identity politics, more and more of 
these new populist ethnic nations may grow up, leave the cradle of the Internet and take 
their place among the list of star performers in the global political stage. In this 
scenario, the rational optimising state described by the popular use of game theory in 
political science becomes overridden by the irrationality of the populist nation. As the 
20th century binarisms of western modernity fade and different cultures compete for 
their own version of modernity, the celebrated freedom of the Internet may be the 
catalyst for the a world in which (for better or worse), Huntington' esque Clash of 
Civilizations (Huntington, 1996) is realised. 
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Appendices 
Keywords Used in Sampling Hong Kong Online Discourse ‘ 
美國 爆炸 America 
開戰 白宮 US 
宣單戈 軍 USA Afghanistan 
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